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. Dynamic Factors 
in Vertical Commodity Systems: 
A Case Study of the Broiler System 
B. W. MARION and H. B. ARTHUR* 
INTRODUCTION 
The organization of the food and fiber economy 
has undergone significant changes in recent years. Of 
particular interest to many have been the changes in 
'·' the organi.zation and coordination of vertical com-
moditysystems. For a wide variety of reasons, many 
systems have moved from loosely organized arrays of 
small firms linked by spot markets toward more com-
pact systems frequently linked by contracts, joint ven-
tu'res, or vertical ownership, and in which large firms 
play an important part. 
Such changes raise questions for businessmen, 
policymakers, and academicians concerning the 
·causes of these changes, the effects on various types 
of performance such as efficiency, progressiveness and 
equity, and the needed strategy or policy response. 
But how does one answer such questions? What con-
ceptual models can be employed to provide some clues 
of what to expect? 
Since these changes are essentially vertical in na-
ture and involve several non-market coordinating in-
struments, existing models are of limited value. The 
market models of economic theory are primarily con-
oerned with the influence of horizontal competitive 
relationships upon performance in a particular mar-
ket. While these models provide useful insights into a 
given market situation, they are hardly conducive to 
a systems approach to a vertical commodity complex. 
Further, the competitive models of economic theory 
are largely static in nature. J. M. Clark said: "The 
theoretical models are uniformly presented as opera-
ting toward an equilibrium ... the nature of this 
equilibrum is the main thing studied ... In the field 
of theory, the most challenging opening seems to be 
for an approach that· would shift the emphasis from 
competition as a mechanism of equilibrium to compe-
tition as a dynamic process ... equilibrum models in 
general afford no positive interpretation of the forces 
of progress.m 
*Dr. Marion is Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics, 
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1Clark, J. M. 1961. Competition as a Dynamic Process. The 
Brookings Institute, Washington, D. C., pp. 43-44. 
An approach is needed which will encourage a 
businessman to look beyond the particular market in 
which he is a participant to understand the vertical 
system of which he is also a part; and which will en-
courage policymakers and academicians to supple-
ment their concepts and concerns about competition 
with a concept of vertical system coordination and 
behavior in a dynamic perspective. 
The central thrust of this research effort was to 
develop and test a conceptual approach which made 
use of existing theories where applicable, yet focused 
primary attention on vertical relationships and on the 
dynamic forces influencing a vertical system over 
time. The conceptual approach used is presented in 
Chapter I and then applied to the vertical broiler sys-
tem in Chapters H-V. In .large part, the approach 
provides a perspective and a· taxonomy or classifica-
tion scheme to examine vertical commodity systems. 
In many ways, it is a modest contribution, falling far 
short of a solid theory of vertical system behavior. 
However, the perspective and the handles it provides 
are extremely useful in examining the broiler system. 
· .. Certainly one measure of the usefulness of a model 
is whether it provides a useful way of viewing the 
world and identifying relevant questions. From this 
standpoint, the conceptual approach used was defi-
nitely valuable. 
The conceptual approach is essentially a com-
bination of several analytical approaches. It utilizes 
the functional, institutional, and market structure ap-
proaches to marketing analysis, yet blends in the de-
cision and authority orientation often found in studies 
of organizations. In this way, the approach adopts 
a decision maker focus, but from a system rather than 
firm point of view. Finally, the perspectiye of a mar-
keting historian is added to consider the dynamics of 
vertical systems, and particularly the change forces 
which have caused the system to evolve over time. 
The conceptual approach attempts to draw on 
and .synthesize the concepts and orientations of several 
academic fields. At least to some extent, it treads 
the middle ground between the economist's focus on 
markets and the behavior of groups of firms, the mana-
gerial theorist's preoccupation with the organization 
and behavior of individual firms, and the historian's 
concern with broad changes over time. In the pro-
cess of merging these different concepts, the authors 
sacrificed some of the precision and rigor possible 
when the concepts are kept in a more pure form. For 
this initial effort, such a sacrifice was warranted. It 
is clearly better to have imprecise answers to the right 
questions than precise answers to the wrong questions. 
While the first concern in this effort was to de-
velop a conceptual approach which would prove use-
ful to businessmen, policymakers, and academicians, 
this was closely followed by a desire to carefully apply 
the approach to an agricultural commodity complex. 
For a variety of reasons, the vertical broiler ~ystem 
was selected for analysis. 
The data were collected through a combination 
of personal interviews, telephone interviews, and vari-
ous publications. Telephone interviews, due to the 
entree provided by a few key people, proved to be very 
effective in obtaining information quickly and effi-
ciently from a widely dispersed sample of individuals. 
For the most part, the cooperation of the people con-
tacted was excellent. 
No standardized interview schedule was em-
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ployed. Rather, the interviews were structured 
· around the conceptual model and the questions it 
provoked. Thirty individuals were interviewed, in~ 
eluding key industry, university, and government 
people. 
The central hypothesis throughout this study was 
that the conceptual model employed would provide 
useful insights into the dynamic forces and control 
devices in vertical commodity systems which have a 
particular influence on· why and how coordination 
and adjustment (two primary dynamic factors in all 
systems) occur or fail to occur. This hypothesis was 
confirmed subjectively. ' 
In Chapter I, a perspective of competition and 
vertical systems is presented, including the conceptual 
model employed in the following chapters. Chapter 
II opens the analysis of the broiler system, discussing 
the objectives, functions, and structures in that sys-
tem. This is followed by a review of the institutions 
and arrangements involved in the system in Chapter 
III, and a discussion of the system decision anatomy 
in Chapter IV. In Chapter V, the focus changes 
from the discussion of the component parts and con-
trol points in the system in Chapters II-IV to consider 
the change forces influencing the system over time. 
Finally, in Chapter VI, some concluding comments 
are provided, both on the broiler system and on the 
conceptual approach used in this study. 
CHAPTER I 
AN OVERALL PERSPECTIVE 
A Perspective of Dynamic Competition 
Students of business behavior in a competitive 
economy interpret the term competition in a number 
of ways. Two of these are particularly relevant in 
this study. 
J. M. Clark defines competition as the _effort of 
business units, acting independently, to make a profit-
able volume of sales in the face of offers of other sellers 
of identical or similar products.2 And while competi-
tion normally involves rivalry, Clark suggests that this 
may or may not be direct and conscious. Under 
conditions approaching those of pure competition, 
such as in the case of Midwest corn farmers, rivalry 
is indirect and is experienced primarily through the 
"market price." For oligopolistic type markets, how-
ever, such as breakfast cereal manufacturing, rivalry 
is direct and conscious. 
Wroe Alderson describes dynamic competition 
as the search for a differential advantage over compet-
itors-the desire to be different. Alderson suggests 
this natural driving force means that heterogeneity 
in markets is the normal and prevailing condition 
rather than homogeneity; and conditions of disequi-
librium tend to exist except where the forces of compe-
. titive rivalry have "temporarily stalled."3 
In this study, the search for a differential advan-
tage as the dominant driving force for private partici-
pants in a capitalistic competitive system has been 
accepted. While this concept of competition is dy-
namic by nature and infers the presence of rivalry, 
Clark points out that such rivalry may take various 
forms. For the Ohio corn farmer, rivalry takes place 
primarily in trying t6 lower his cost of production and 
anticipate corn prices. For the Kellogg Co., rivalry 
is more directly focused on vying to be chosen by con-
sumers of breakfast cereal. 
To this primary moving force, a secondary and 
sometimes conflicting force is added. This is the de-
sire for reasonably peaceful business conditions; i.e., 
the removal of conflict, stress, and instability. While 
there may be exceptions, open warfare is normally not 
desired by businessmen. Conflict, when it reaches cer-
tain levels, is unpleasant, increases the level of uncer-
tainty, is probably detrimental to profit, and will lead 
to resolute action by those involved. Indeed, busi-
nessmen would be the first to proclaim the need for 
laws to assure honest dealings and property rights. 
This force, then, tends to move the firm and the mar-
2Clark, J. M. 1969. What is Competition? In The Environment 
of Marketing Behavior, Second Edition, edited by Robert Holloway 
and Robert Hancock, John Wiley and Sons, New York, p. 195. 
3Alderson, Wroe. 1957. Market Behavior and Executive Action. 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Ill. 
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ket away from conditions of severe disequilibrium to-
ward a more balanced position of controlled market 
dynamics. 
The third and temporal dimension of dynamic 
competition is that of a constantly changing environ-
ment. Because of the changing nature of market in-
stitutions and market rules, technology, societal values 
and tastes, the political environment, and firm and in-
dustry organization, firms face conditions akin to a 
game of chess on a changing board with periodic shifts 
in the rules. A relevant differential advantage today, 
even if not offset by competitors, may be an irrelevant 
advantage in the future. The graveyards of business 
are dotted with firms which achieved and clung to a 
differential advantage whpe the changing environ-
ment made it irrelevant.4 
These three forces represent the major dynamic 
dimensions of competition as perceived by the authors. 
Broad and pervasive in their presence (but varying in 
intensity), these forces gener<;lte the pressure and stress 
in firms and industries which stimulate actfon.5 
This perspective emphasizes competition as a 
dynamic, ever-changing process. It suggests that dis-
equilibrium and adjustments are natural parts of this 
process, not a departure from normality. 
While this concept of competition bears most 
directly on the interaction of competing firms (in their 
horizontal relationships), it also influences the per·-
spective of vertical relationships. For example, it 
would be highly inconsistent to embrace the above 
concept of competition, yet view vertical market sys-
tems as equilibrium tending logistics and physical 
distribution systems. 
4See Why Some Companil')s Perish While Others Prosper; The Les-
son of Half a Century. Forbes, Sept. 15, 1967; and Levitt, Theodore. 
July-August 1960. Market Myopia. Harvard Business Review. 
5Recognizing that these are broad forces influencing firm, indus-
try, and system behavior, it is worth noting that the individual deci-
sion maker often faces choices which are not clear cut. Many deci-
sions are made without a definite goal in mind or without being sure 
of the consequence of alternative choices. In short, uncertainty and 
the absence of information are more important elements of the deci-
sion environment than are often recognized. Experience suggests that 
the high level of uncertainty surrounding many decisions results in at 
least three types of decision making rationale. These include: 
a. Reward potential-the selection of alternatives representing 
an opportunity to bring individual or company rewards; i.e., contribu-
ting to the achievement of individual or company goals. 
b. Penalty potential-motivation based upon avoiding activi-
ties which are illegal or are likely to penalize the individual or firm. 
These forces may act largely in delimiting the alternatives a decision 
maker considers. 
c. Neutral potential-this might be interpreted as a form of 
penalty minimizing motivation in that the desire for certainty and 
safety is the predominant for~e. Political theorists have defined iner-
tia and default on decisions (muddling through) as an important force 
in the operation and evolution of the political world. (See Lindblom, 
Charles. 1968. The Policy Making Process. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Engle-
wood Cliffs, N. J .) This force is also present in decision making at 
the firm level. 
Vertical market systems are interrelated social 
and economic systems which are constantly evolving 
· and adjusting because of pressures and imbalances 
resulting from horizontal competition, vertical con-
flict, changes in market rules or arrangements, an~ 
environmental forces. It should be clear, however, 
that this is far from a unanimous point of view. Other 
economists tend to see vertical systems as equilibrium 
tending physical transformation, logistics and dis-
tribution systems. This latter view tends to empha-
size the engineering-economic dimensions of a vertical 
system, the vertical value adding functions to ful-
fill a given demand, and the efficiency of the system 
in performi~g its functions-particularly the physical 
functions. 
,. This perspective is not incorrect. It is, however, 
incomplete since it largely ignores the adjustment and 
adaptation characteristics of vertical systems which 
are so critical in the long run, the demand influencing 
functions of systems, and the behavioral dimensions 
of vertical systems. Explicitly including these char-
acteristics poses definite problems in attempting a 
rigorous analysis of vertical systems. Their interrela-
tionships with other aspects of system behavior or per-
formance are difficult to examine in any precise way, 
in part because they are difficult to define or measure. 
Efforts to develop simulation models of vertical sys-
tems often omit some or all of these system charac-
teristics. As a result, Iflany of the most important 
dimensions of vertical systems unfortunately are over-
looked in such models. 
The conceptual approach used in this study at-
tempts to embrace the totality of dynamic systems. 
This includes some factors or incidents which are not 
easy to measure, either because they are nonrecurrent 
ev_ents or are qualitative in their nature or impact. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the coordination and 
adaptation of vertical systems, along with the factors 
influencing these two central functions of dynamic 
systems. Since both coordination and adaptation de-
pend heavily upon decisions translating various forces 
and motivations into actions, attention is also focused 
on the decision anatomy of vertical systems .. Since 
this study is primarily concerned with vertical systems 
handling agricultural commodities, the terms vertical 
commodity complex or commodity system are general-
ly used in lieu of the broader term, vertical market sys-
tem. 
Dimensions .and Components 
of a Vertical Co.mmodity Complex 
A vertical commodity complex or system is an in-
terdependent array of organizations, resources, func-
tions, rules, information, and human behavior involved 
in producing, processing, and distributing an agricul-
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tural commodity. The terms commodity complex or 
vertical complex are sometimes used to refer to the 
total scope of a vertically integrated firm. However, 
the term is used by the authors in the aggregate sense 
only. 
The boundaries of a commodity complex are 
arbitrarily defined by the definition of the commodity 
(e.g., processing vegetables or frozen sweet corn) and 
by the extent to which the various input systems or 
output channels are analyzed vertically. That is, 
where does one start and stop in the vertical system? 
With the broiler complex, one can begin at the hatch-
ery supply flock level, or can choose to include some 
of the input systems, such as breeder chick production, 
feed manufacturing, machinery manufacturing, and 
even genetic research. Likewise, at the output end 
of the complex, one can stop short of or include the 
international broiler system. To confine the analysis 
to manageable proportions, limits must be set. Yet, 
the growing awareness of the wide variety of interrela-
tionships affecting a commodity complex encourages 
expansion of what is considered a relevant part of the 
complex. 
Industry refers to a set of one or more organiza-
tions similar in the functions performed and the prod-
ucts produced, and related primarily as horizontal 
competitors. A commodity complex generally in-
cludes several industries. The scope and boundaries 
of an industry become more difficult to define as the 
typical proprietary boundaries change. The vertical 
broiler system in previous years, for example, could be 
logically divided into the breeder, broiler hatchery sup-
ply flock, chick hatchery, grow-out, processing, and 
wholesale-retail industries. Today, the middle four 
stages plus feed manufacturing are typically within the 
scope of an individual firm, representing just one in-
dustry. To the extent distinct functions can be sepa-
rated, it is of value to consider these as stages in the 
product flow, even though individual firms may per-
form all the functions. 
The various components of a commodity complex 
can be classified in a variety of ways. The anatomical 
breakdown used for this study is: 
• System purpose or objectives. While systems 
rarely have objectives representing a consensus 
of its members, it is often useful to define the im-
plied objectives. What does the system appear 
to be trying to accomplish? In instances where 
parallel vertical systems exist within the same 
commodity system (e.g., private labels and na-
tional brands), the implicit objectives of such sys-
tems are important to distinguish. 
• Stages of the industrialization process and the 
functions performed. This is simply a prag-
matic identification of the jobs to be done and 
the grouping of such jobs at each stage in the 
value adding process. . Product characteristics, 
spatial and temporal dimensions, and product 
flow channels are also included. 
• Proprietary and authority structure. This re-
lates to the firms, agencies, and individuals popu-
lating the system. It is concerned with who has 
control or authority over what. Also, how is 
the risk distributed? The structure of the in-
dustries at each proprietary level in a system is 
also examined. 
• Coordinating and regulating institutions and ar-
rangements. These include facilitative and re-
straining instruments which may be both tangi-
ble and intangible. Organized market places, 
trade practices, information systems, government 
grades and regulations, trade associations, trans-
portation services, and credit services are some of 
the factors included. 
•'Decision anatomy. This is the network of criti-
cal decision points and associated authority dis-
tributed throughout the system. In addition to 
the location of decision points, the type of deci-
sions (unilateral, bilateral, institutional, etc.), 
and the decision environment (the forces bearing 
on the decision maker) are relevant considera-
tions. 
• Forces and instruments of change (or inertia). 
These include the on-going dynamics of a system 
leading to or impeding change and adaptation. 
The evolution of a system and its responsiveness 
to external and internal pressures and develop-
ments are examined, along with the instruments 
or vehicles of change (new laws, university re-
search, innovative firm, etc.). 
The first and last dimensions can be thought of 
as the primary sources of change and adjustment. 
These are the pressures, the motivations, the imbal-
ances resulting in action (or inaction) by members of 
a vertical system. The other four dimensions are the 
means by which such forces are translated into ac-
tions. In a very real sense, they represent the -struc-
tural anatomy and the nervous system of the vertical 
complex. 
This is the classification scheme used to study the 
vertical broiler system. Chapters II-V are organized 
on this basis. 
Particular attention is placed on adaptation and 
coordination of vertical commodity systems, and on 
competition at different levels in vertical systems. 
Since adaptati,on and coordination have received rela-
tively little treatment in the published literature, some 
comments are in order before turning attention to the 
broiler system. 
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Adaptation and Evolution of Commodity Complexes 
Vertical systems are generally evolving systems, 
as opposed to steady state systems. They are con-
tinually ad justing and adapting to pressures and im-
balances emanating from horizontal competition, ver-
tical conflict, and environmental forces. This is not 
to suggest, however, that all vertical systems are 
equally responsive and adaptive. Quite clearly, his-
tory suggests this is not so. 
The factors influencing a system's adaptability 
are open to conjecture. McCammon suggested: 
" ... institutional change in marketing tends to be a 
process in which firms and channels maneuver for 
short-run advantage and in which they adapt almost 
imperceptibly to environmental disturbances." 6 
Since members of established vertical systems of-
ten resist or respond only incrementally to innov'ltions, 
major innovations-particularly those threatening to 
restructure the system-are generally introduced by 
firms or agencies outside the system. Relatively free 
entry would therefore appear to be important to sys-
tem adaptability. 
The structure and control of the vertical system 
may also influence its responsiveness and adaptability. 
Although empirical data are lacking, one might hypo-
thesize that the accuracy with which consumer prefer-
ences are transmitted (hence the possibility that sys-
tem adjustments will be relevant) improves when re-
tail outlets are organized (so they have some power 
in the market place), are free of significant manufac-
turer control, and handle the products of several 
manufacturers, as compared to the opposite extreme 
of manufacturer owned and controlled retail outlets. 
In addition, logic suggests other influences on 
system responsiveness and adaptability, such as the 
presence or absence of innovative firms at different 
levels in a system to set the pace for others, the 
growth-maturity stage of the system, the existence of 
government guarantees or other shields from market 
forces, anq the balance of conflict and cooperation in 
the system. 
A commodity complex is very much a living 
ecological system; it adjusts and adapts, it influences, 
and in some cases it dies. The control devices in the 
complex which interpret, respond, and in many cases 
initiate forces of change or inertia are the decisions in 
the firms and institutions which are a part of or serve 
the complex. 
Pressures and imbalances, to a certain degree, 
always exist within a commodity complex. As they 
reach a threshold of intensity (which varies for dif-
6McCammon, Bert C., Jr. 1969. Alternative Explanations of In-
stitutional Change and Channel Evolution. In The Marketing Chan-
nel; A Conceptual Viewpoint, edited by Bruce Mallen, John Wiley & 
Sons, New Y9rk. 
ferent firms), decisions are made to fill the vacuum 
(a pull pressure) or to relieve the pressure (a push 
pressure) . Members of the commodity complex are 
likely to respond to remove excessive pressure and con-
flict as long as the existence of the commodity com-
plex is beneficial to the achit;vement of their individ-
ual goals. If the basic purpose of the complex or the 
methods of achieving that purpose are in serious dis-
harmony with those of its members, the existing com-
modity complex is likely to be reorganized or aban-
doned. 
From a historical perspective, the evolving char-
acteristics of a commodity complex are easily observed 
and explained, at least at a surface level of investi-
gation. Certain critical events can often be defined 
which significantly altered the characteristics and op-
erations of the commodity complex. 
In some cases, they were initiated by the action 
of a particular company or government agency. Man-
datory federal inspection for broilers shipped in inter-
state commerce went into effect in 1959, and is a case 
in point. It had the immediate effect of speeding up 
the demise of small processors and the expansion and 
modernization of many plants which remained. This 
soon led to another wave of qver-capacity in process-
ing, which in turn spurred competition for the supply 
of live birds and efforts to lockin supplies by contracts. 
~ocking in supplies by contracting was being prac-
ticed to some extent before mandatory inspection, 
and the over-capacity in processing which resulted 
was ~n added stimulus to this trend. Mandatory in·-
spect10n sped up the evolutionary process in the broil-
er complex, but did not significantly change its direc-
tion.7 
In contrast to mandatory inspection, most change 
events occur in increments and result from a series 
of decisions over time. Pinpointing an innovative 
decision at its beginning may be impossible. The 
credit and financing situation in today's broiler com-
plex, for example, is the cumulative result of many 
incremental decisions since World War II. Step by 
step, feed dealers and other suppliers expanded and 
liberalized credit to growers until the move to retain 
ownership of the chicks, supply the feed, and contract 
for the employment of the growers' labor and facilities 
was just another incremental step in the evolutionary 
process. 
7Not all parts ~f the broiler complex went through the same evo-
lutionary process. Broiler production in some of the newer areas 
such as Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi was largely initiated un-
der contracts, whereas production in older areas such as New England 
and Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia evolved from producer owner-
ship and financing of birds, feed, etc. to contract production. In the 
newer areas, contracts were necessary to encourage production and 
allowed integrators to concentrate production near their cent~rs of 
operations for greater efficiency. 
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Identification of specific decisions initiating 
change events may be possible in some cases, but in 
many m,ay not. At the same time, it is recognized 
that decisions are the activators of change. The 
change may be gradual or sudden, may stem from the 
action of few or many 'decision makers, and may or 
may not be traceable to any particular decision. Still, 
it is known that decision makers, operating with cer-
tain goals and influenced by a variety of pressures, 
made decisions to cause such a change. 
Coordination in a Commodity Complex 
To this point, the discussion has concentrated on 
the evolving or adjusting aspect of system dynamics. 
The term dynamic also refers to motion. It is to this 
interpretation that attention is now directed. 
The rate of change and adaptation in vertical 
systems varies greatly. While some are undergoing 
substantial restructuring and reorganization, other 
systems have reached a plateau in their evolutionary 
process. In any case, however, the dynamics involved 
in the internal operation and functioning of the 
complex are of continued importance. A variety of 
inputs are absorbed and transformed by the functions 
performed by a number of organizations into saleable 
goods and services. This value adding process, to 
· effectively mesh with market demands, requires co-
ordination. 
Because of the interdependence yet independence 
of members of a commodity complex, coordination of 
the various functions and organizations is essential if 
some degree of order and efficiency is to be realized 
in accomplishing the fundamental purpose of the com-
plex. The need for coordination is a unifying force 
drawing its power from the community of inter·ests of 
the members of the complex. The degree of coordi-
nation attained depends in p'art on the level of com-
mitment of system members to the survival of the sys-
tem and of other system. members. This determines 
the extent to which individual interests will be sub-
ordinated to the effectiveness of the total complex. 
At any given point in time, coordination of a 
vertical complex depends upon existing institutions 
and arrangements (including markets, rules and regu-
lations, trade practices, and facilitating organiza-
tions) ; the flow of information (including its accur-
acy, quantity, and timing) ; and decisions. 
Existing institutions and arrangements are the 
instruments or the vehicles through which coordina-
tion takes place. They have a strong influence on 
the extent to which market signals are accurately and 
promptly relayed to system members, and hence on 
system responsiveness. For example, one of the bene-
fits from contracts as compared to spot markets in 
linking system members is the increased information 
flow which often occurs. If the contract is part of a 
long term continuous relationship, higher levels of 
cooperation and understanding also might be expect-
ed, although this depends upon the degree of depend-
ency of each party on the other. 
Given the institutions and arrangements and 
flow of information in the system, management deci-
sions actually perform the coordinating task. In this 
respect, the concept of a system decision anatomy is 
analytically useful. The decision anatomy refers to 
the network of decision points and associated authority 
extending throughout the system. It represents the 
nervous system by which coordination and adjustments 
take place. 8 
The decision anatomy of a system provides an 
overall view of the control points and the distribution 
of authority and influence for the entire system. In 
some cases, decisions rest on sovereign authority, as in 
the case of federal regulations; in other cases, the au-
thority is shared between two entities, as is true with bi-
lateral transactions; in still other instances, d~cisions 
are unilateral due to property rights, customs, or other 
bases of authority. Attempting to define and under-
stand the decision anatomy of a system causes one to 
examine the location and basis of decision controls. 
The structure of authority and decisions within 
organizations in a system also have a bearing on sys-
tem coordination. Lawrence and Lorsch found, for 
example, that firms facing rapidly changing and un-
certain environments need to have a relatively flat or-
ganizational structure in which considerable authority 
8For further comments on this approach, see Arthur, Henry B., 
et al. 1969. Tropical Agribusiness Structures and Adjustments-
Bananas. Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Admin-
istration, Harvard University, Chapter 7. 
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and freedom is delegated to lower levels. On the oth-
er hand, firms in a relatively unchanging business en-
vironment can operate with less delegation, tighter in-
ternal controls, and simpler channels of communica-
tion. 9 Since an organization must carry on transac-
tions with its environment simply to survive, the char-
acteristics of the organization need to be consistent 
with the various segments of the environments with 
which it deals. In trying to understand coordination 
and adaptation in a vertical system, the distribution 
of decisions and authority, both for the total system 
and for individual firms, may warrant examination. 
The foregoing suggests the importance of under-
standing the distribution of authority and decisions 
within a system. Attempting to understand why cer-
tain decisions are made requires examining yet anoth-
er dimension-the set of forces bearing on decision 
makers. These include: competitive forces, the goals 
and values of individuals and organizations, their per-
ceived role and power in the system, economic-politi-
cal-social forces, etc. Both the forces and the 'inter-
pretation of them may change from one decision point 
to another. The greater the difference in the set of 
forces bearing on decision makers at different l~vels 
in the system, the more difficult the. integration and 
coordination task. 
Chapter I has briefly sketched the perspective 
and conceptual approach used in analyzing the ver-
tical broiler complex. While far from complete or 
definitive, it hopefully . suggests the general W eltan-
schauung of the authors. With this as background, 
attention is turned to the vertical broiler system. 
9Lawrence, P. and J. Lorsch. 1969. Developing Organizations: 
Diagnosis and Action. Addison-Wesley Co., Reading, Mass. 
CHAPTER II 
THE VERTICAL BROILER COMPLEX: OBJECTIVES, FUNCTIONS, AND STRUCTURES 
"Among agricultural industries none changed so 
profoundly in the two decades following World War 
II as those of poultry and eggs. Changes came in 
technology, organization, and location.mo 
In part because of its rapid change, much has 
been written about the U. S. broiler system that ver-
tical system extending from the foundati~n breeder 
of broiler chickens to the consume_r .11 This report 
does not attempt to summarize the various studies 
made by others, but rather focuses particular atten-
tion on the. dynamic forces and control devices involved 
in the rapid changes and considerable success realized 
by this vertical system. 
The Broiler Success Story 
American consumers ate approximately 37 lb. 
of broilers per capita in 1971. This represented a 
four-fold increase in consumption since 1950 ( 8. 7 lb.), 
and nearly a 60% increase since 1960 (23.4 lb.).12 
Many of the reasons behind this dramatic growth are 
well documented. Technological developments in 
genetics, feeding, disease control, housing, and me-
chanization provided a major thrust. ·Changes in the 
structure, financing, and organization of the broiler 
complex also played significant roles, as fewer but 
larger volume firms emerged which performed many 
of the functions in the vertical complex. These and 
other forces resulted in a significant reduction in the 
cost per pound of broilers. 
During the same period, the cost of red meat 
was steadily trendjng upward. Stimulated in addi-
tion by frequent retail-specializing, the development 
of fried chicken fast food outlets, and increasing con-
sumer incomes, broilers drew strong consumer support 
and patronage. 
That is a thumbnail sketch of the broiler success 
story, a drama widely proclaimed in this country and 
around the world.13 Yet, it tells little about the ac-
tors creating the drama; of the work, risks, trials, and 
errors which evolved into an efficient industrialized 
system; of the reasons behind the changes made; of 
the problems, conflicts, and change forces shaping the 
10National Commission on Food Marketing. June 1966. Organi-
zation and Competition in the Poultry and Egg Industries. Tech. Study 
No. 2i:ri U. S. Government Printing Office, p. l. 
In addition to the above, see for example Tobin & Arthur, 1964. 
Dynamics of Adjustment in the Broiler Industry. Division of Research, 
Gradua.te School ~f B.usiness Administration, Harvard University, and 
the series of publ1cat1ons on Marketing New England Poultry by the 
New Hampshire Agricultural Experiment Station. 
.t2Poultry and Egg Situation. PES 261 and PES 272, Economic 
Research Service, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, April 1970, p. 19, and 
June 1972, p. 15. 
13For a popularized version of the broiler success story, see Saw-
yer, Gordon. 1971. The Agribusiness Poultry Industry-A History of 
Its Development. Exposition Pres~, Inc., Jericho, N. Y. 
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system; or of the extent to which the changes resulted 
from outside forces thrust upon the system, or from in-
side forces emanating from private decisions. 
Time, space, and information limitations pre-
clude complete documentation of the actors, decisions, 
and reasons contributing to the evolution of the broil-
er complex. However, sufficient instances have been 
selected to demonstrate the important fm:ces influen-
cing the degree of coordination and adaptability of 
the system, including the role of decisions as the con-
trol network for such forces in the broiler complex. 
The Broiler Complex as a System 
"The primary function of almost any industry 
can be thought of as the efficient bringing together-
the integrating-of the resources, products, and ser-
vices needed to provide an end product that will best 
satisfy the needs of customers.m4 
This is certainly true of the broiler system. And 
the dramatic reduction in the cost per pound of broil-
ers and concomitant increase in consumption suggest 
that the system has performed well in accomplishing 
this task. However, while this is the general purpose 
of most industries and vertical systems, the more spe-
cific foci may vary from system to system. Thus, it i.s 
useful to define the apparent objectives of a system. 
System 0 bjectives 
"Almost every industry exists because it has a 
market to serve. Serving the market is the prime ob-
jective, to which most others are subordinate regard-
less of how important they seem to be at the moment. 
Individual firm objectives must be compatible with 
this and other overall industry objectives if the firm 
is to survive in a competitive world.m5 
Many readers may be bothered by the idea of 
system objectives, since this suggests collective agree-
ment by system members on certain goals. In fact, 
of course, this does not occur in an explicit fashion. 
However, certain implicit purposes or objectives can 
be derived from the accomplishments and behavior 
of a vertical system. That is, what does the system 
seem to be trying to achieve? It is in this sense that 
this term is used. 
The notion of system objectives is suggested be-
cause it is conceptually useful in examining various 
• 
114Tobin and A~thur, op cit., p. 5. The term industry as used by 
T«_b~n and Arthur 1s synonymous with the terms vertical system or 
vertical complex used in this report. 
• ~5Arthur, Henry, et al., Tropical Agribusiness ... , op. cit., p. 116 . 
This 1s not to suggest, however, that firms must always adjust their 
objectives to be compatible with the purposes of an existing system. 
In some instances, a firm whose objectives (profit, stability, growth, 
etc.) are incompatible with system objectives may survive by leaving 
an existing vertical system and organizing another system that will 
facilitate the achievement of its objectives. 
vertical systems. It would also seem to be useful for 
members of a system to compare their interests and 
goals with the objectives of the system as they perceive 
them. Are they in harmony? 
In many cases, the objectives of a system are the 
result of system membe~s trying to achieve other goals, 
such as profits, growth, or survival. The system's ob-
jectives may in fact be the means or a by-product of 
member firms achieving their individual goals. 
In the U.S. broiler complex, providing whole-
some fresh broilers to consumers at the lowest possible 
price seems to have been the overriding system objec-
tive for several years.16 The more specific subob-
jectives have changed over time, however. For ex-
ample, in the pre-World War II period, wholesome 
broilers meant New Yor~-dressed birds which were 
largely not federally inspected. By the early 1960's, 
wholesome broilers meant ready-to-eat eviscerated 
broilers which were predominantly federally inspect-
ed. Now, the interpretation is once again shifting as 
increasing quantities are being sold through fried 
chicken carryout restaurants, and in pre-cooked or 
further processed forms. A definite desire to shift 
away from fresh undifferentiated broilers is apparent. 
The basic objective of the vertical broiler com-
plex has remained oriented toward filling a market 
need, and doing so efficiently. The more specific 
objectives have changed as consumer desires have 
shifted and as the firms in the system have developed 
new ways of satisfying consumer demands. 
Ancillary objectives which appear to have been 
present in the U. S. broiler system include expansion 
of the total consumption of broiler meat world wide 
and attainment of stability in broiler supplies and 
prices. 
Efforts to expand total consumption have largely 
re.lied on increased efficiencies placing broilers in a 
favorable cost position relative to other meats. In 
economists' terms, the efforts have focused more on 
moving outward along the demand curve for fresh 
broilers, rather than on shifting the curve through ad-
vertising, product development, etc. More interest 
is now being shown in the latter approaches in the U.S. 
as opportunities to reduce broiler costs have largely 
been exploited, and much of the consumption in-
creases to be gained from lower broiler costs have al-
ready been realized. 
Increases in the foreign consumption of broilers 
have resulted from two different and to some extent 
competing efforts by members of the U.S. broiler sys-
16This objective is the result of member firms trying to out-do 
their competitors in order to hold or expand markets. Competition 
to sell chicks, feed, equipment, and other inputs led to technological 
advances which were quickly adopted by broiler firms. Low priced, 
quality broilers resulted, although it's doubtful that individual mem-
ber firms held this as a goal. 
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tern. Fresh and frozen broilers and broiler parts have 
been exported by U.S. firms to other countries. The 
100 million lb. exported in 1971 represented about 
1.28% of the total slaughtered.17 
Of greater importance have been the efforts by 
U. S. firms (breeders and integrators) to export tech-
nology and/ or develop subsidiaries in foreign coun-
tries. The development of foreign broiler industries 
has helped alleviate the world's nutrition problems 
and at the same time contributed to the expansion of 
total broiler production and consumption. 
The 1969 Annual Report of International Basic 
Economy Corporation states: 
". . . the company's (i.e., its subsidiary, Arbor 
Acres) proven genetic research capability has been a 
key force in the establishment of a modern poultry 
industry in 23 other nations ... when Arbor Acres be-
gan its breeding operation in Argentina, only a very 
small part of the poultry consumed in the country 
was commercially produced . . . within a relatively 
short time, Arbor Acres demonstrated that its tech-
niques could raise a bird to market in 8;;2 weeks as 
opposed to 13 weeks, and do it at about one-third of 
the cost. ms 
The president of one of the U. S. foundation 
breeding companies estimated that approximately 
one-half of the income of U.S. breeders was from for-
eign operations in 1969. The world market for meat 
stock breeders was estimated at $60 million in 1971, 
and is expected to grow to $ 7 5 million by 19 7 5. U. S. 
and Canadian sales are expected to represent only 40 
percent of the world market by 1975 because of the 
more rapid growth of foreign markets.19 
Attainment of Stability. "The instability prob-
lem, with its recurrent distress prices, has preoccu-
pied the industry more than almost any other."20 
Figure 1 indicates the average farm broiler 
prices from 1956 to 1972. The long term decline in 
broiler prioes continued through 1961, but has leveled 
off since then. However periodic price depressions 
continue to characterize the system-most recently in 
1970, 1971, and 1972. Monthly prices show even 
greater gyrations. For example, while the average 
farm price during 1971 was 13.7 cents per pound, the 
monthly prices ranged from 12.1 to 15.6 cents per 
pound (Figure 2) . 21 
17Poultry and Egg Situation. June 1972. PES-272, Economic Re-
search Service, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, pp. 21 and 28. 
:isl 969 Annual Report, International Basic Economy Corporation, 
New York, p. 12. 
1ssee An Anniversary Talk with Went Hubbard, Broiler Industry, 
Garden State Publishing Co., Sea Isle City, N. J., August 1971. 
20Tobin and Arthur, op. cit., p. 6. 
21These prices are not the amount paid to contract broiler growers 
for their services; rather, they represent the derived value of live 
broilers based on prices received by integrators for ready-to-cook 
broilers. 
The pounds slaughtered and farm prices by 
month during 1970 and 1971 are shown in Figure 2. 
Although integrators reduce production for the fall 
months and increase production for the summer 
months in response to fluctuations in demand, the pro-
duction adjustments are often not sufficient to achieve 
uniform prices. 
A variety of efforts within the industry and by 
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FIG. 2.-Volume Slaughtered and Farm Prices by Month, 1970 and 1971. 
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the federal government have been aimed at the insta-
bility problem. Although many have held hopes that 
greater stability would be realized as the industry 
moved increasingly into the hands of professional 
managers, little if any progress is apparent. 
Stages of the Industrial Process, Proprietary 
and Authority Structure, and the Functions Performed 
Figure 3 shows the stages of the industrial pro-
cess involved in converting research and development 
in the breeder's genetic laboratories into ready-to-eat 
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nd Institutions and Retailers 
broilers at. a restaurant or retail store. The stages in-
volved have '-remained much the· same over' the last 
decade or two. In 'some cases, an additional stage of 
pullet · raising' is inserted between the parent stock 
hatchery and the hatchery supply flock 'stage. Fre-
quently, however, this function is performed at the 
hatchery .supply flock: stage. 
The wholesale distributor or broker stage has 
gradually declined in importance as both processor 
sellers and retail buyers have increased in size and in 
the propensity to deal direct.22 Many distributors 
still perform a warehousing and store delivery func-
tion. Some of the more successful distributors have 
become more innovative and aggressive in the service 
performed for the seller and ~he buyer. Some pro-
vide custom cutting and packaging services for retail 
firms, while most have become more diligent as local 
representatives of their clients' product.23 
While the stages involved have remained rela-
tively constant, changes have taken place in the func-
tions performed (or tasks to be done) at different 
stages-and the way these functions are performed.~4 
The former is largely the result of organizational 
changes in the industry; the latter of technological 
developments. 
At one time, many of the stages shown in Figure 
3 were in the hands of separate firms. The stages 
were linked by market transactions. Foundation 
br·eeders sold chicks to hatchery supply flock produ-
cers, who sold eggs to hatcheries, who sold chicks to 
broiler growers, who sold grown broilers to processing 
plants, who sold dressed broilers to distribution agen-
cies. Under this arrangement, the product moved 
through six to eight separate entities on its journey to 
the consumer. At each firm, decisions were made 
which could affect the coordination and stability of 
the total system. Since each firm took possession of 
the product, it accepted responsibility for obtain-
ing the necessary inputs, transforming the product, 
selling their output, providing the necessary financing, 
and managing their risk exposure. Rapid growth 
and price instabilities made this proprietary and au-
thority structure untenable, particularly for broiler 
growers who faced heavy financial requirements and 
a high exposure to price fluctuations. 
220ne source estimates that 40 % of RTC broilers were shipped 
direct to retailers and institutions in 1955, and that by 1970 this had 
increased to approximately 75 % . Another source estimates that 
53 % of RTC broilers were sold through distributors in 1960 and 
43 % in 1970. The trend is the same in both cases but the magni-
tude varies considerably. 
23For two reports on successful distributors, see Broiler Industry, 
April 1968 and April 1971. 
24The functions performed at any stage can be grouped into four 
or fewer categories. These are procurement of inputs; transformation, 
storage, and transportation operations; sale or discharge of products; 
and custodial requirements (financing, risk bearing, management in-
formation). 
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· The proprietary and authority structure which 
has emerged during the last 15 years is one involving 
only three major commercial entities: the primary 
breeder, the broiler integrator, and the retail or in-
stitutional outlet. The"causes behind and routes by 
which this restructuring took place will be discussed 
later. , 
Figure 3 indicates f~1e ownership arrangements 
for the various stages and the types of market linkages 
which most frequently tie the present U. S. broiler 
system together. It does not attempt to indicate all 
of the functions involved or who makes the decisions 
controlling such functions. 
. At the primary breeder level, the genetic research 
lab, pedigree flocks, and grandparent stock hatchery 
tend to be located together, often at the headquarters 
of the breeding firm. The development and labora-
tory testing of new birds occurs at this level, as does 
the planning of the total operation for both the short 
and long run. 
The breeder maintains ownership and control 
through the grandparent expansion flocks and the 
parent stock hatchery, which are usually distributed 
geographically to serve the various broiler growing 
ar·eas. Although the breeder maintains ownership of 
the grandparent flocks, he may lease the facilities from 
a produce:r-investor who constructs them to his speci-
fications, own them outright, or in a few cases con-
tract for the labor and facilities of a poultry produ-
cer. In most cases, the managers of the expansion 
flocks are employees of the breeding firm. 
Male and female chicks from the same strain or 
generation are di~tributed to ·the expansion flocks 
from the grandparent stock hatchery. After being 
raised to laying age ( 6 to 8 months), these males and 
females are used to multiply the strain by producing 
eggs for the parent stock hatchery for 7 to 8 months. 
The parent stock hatchery in an area collects the eggs 
from the expansion flocks, hatches them into chicks, 
sorts them by sex, culls out inferior chicks, disposes 
of that sex of chicks which will not be used for cross-
breeding, and delivers the male or female chicks to 
the integrator's hatchery supply flocks, where they 
will be crossbred and used as parents of broiler chicks 
to be grown, slaughtered, and marketed. 
In general, breeders have not integrated into pro-
viding their own feed and similar supplies. Feed, 
medication, equipment, and other supplies tend to be 
purchased via spot transactions from firms producing 
these inputs. Feed manufacturing would appear to 
represent the best prospect for integration because of 
the volume used by breeders. However, the geo-
graphic dispersion of their operations raises questions 
concerning its economic feasibility. Further, although 
feed represents a large share of the variable expense 
of producing breeding chicks, it represents a relatively 
small portion- of the total cost. 
Primary breeders have generally specialized in 
either male or female birds. This continues to be 
true although most breeding companies are now off er-
ing birds of both sexes. At least to some extent, this 
has been an outgrowth of foreign operations where it 
has proven desirable to provide both·pullets and cock-
erels. Providing both male and female birds gives 
the breeder more control_over the genetic make-up of 
the broiler chicks, which offers. definite advantages. 
The sale of chicks to the integrator for his hatch-
ery supply flocks represents the first market transac-
tion in the vertical broiler system. The subsequent 
four stages of the system are in most cases under the 
control of the integrator, as is feed manufacturing. 
At two of these stages, the hatchery supply flock and 
the grow-out ·operation, the integrator frequently does 
not own the facilities or provide the labor, but instead 
contracts with producers for their labor and facilities. 
More variance exists at the hatchery supply flock stage 
where some integrators have both company-owned 
and contracted operations. In some instances, the 
integrator operates separate pullet rearing farms, and 
contr"acis the egg laying operations. In nearly all 
cases, however, the integrator retains ownership of the 
birds throughout, provides the feed, medication, iri 
some cases litter and· fuel, and definite management 
guidelines for the flock manager. Although · opera-
tions may be conducted by others, commercial con-
trol remains in the hands of the integrating firm .. 
Arrangements for the grow-out function "are 
more uniform across integrators. While the quantity 
being produced at integrator-owned facilities .has 
slowly increased ( 5 to 7 % of total), it is estimat_ed 
that 90 to 95 % of the broilers are produced under 
some type of contractual arrangement.25 . The types 
and specific terms of grower contracts vary consider-
ably; however, the grower primarily provides the 
labor, buildings and equipment, and fa some cases 
fuel, utilities, and litter. In turn, the growers ·are 
usually guaranteed a fixed amount per pound or per 
bird produced, with additional payments dependent 
upon feed conversion efficiency and/ or the. market 
price.26 
25Gallimore, William and James Vertrees. May 1968. Contract 
Arrangements in the Poultry Industry. Marketing· and Transportation 
Situation, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture. 
~6For a good analysis of grower contracts, see P & SA-1, The 
Broiler Industry, Packers and Stockyards Administration, U. S. Dept. of 
Agriculture, August 1967, and MRR 814, A Comparison of Returns 
to Poultry Growers, Economic Research Service, U.S.D.A., Feb. 1968. 














consumed as whole 
or cut-up birds 
93% 
*INCLUDES FAST• FOOD OUTLETS, 
RESTAURANTS, SCHOOLS, AND 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS. 
Source: The Chicken Broiler Industry: Structure, Practices and Costs. MRR 930, Economic Research Service, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, p. 30. 
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The integrator's ohatchery collects eggs from the 
hatchery supply flocks, hatches the eggs, culls poor 
chicks, and distributes broiler chicks to the grow-out 
operations. The processing plant performs the broil-
er assembly function, processes the birds, and distrib-
utes the end products to institutions, retail firms, fur-
ther processors or exporters. 
The major marketing channels for broilers in 
1969, as reported in a U.S.D.A. study, are shown in 
Figure 4. The percentage sold through wholesale 
distributors is open to some question. A study con-
ducted by Dr. Robert Wunderle of the National Broil-
er Council found that 43% of the broilers in 1970 
were marketed through distributors, 42% were sold 
direct to retail organizations, and 7 % were sold direct 
to restaurants and institutions.27 
Both sources estimate that approximately one-
fourth of all broilers are sold through restaurants and 
institutions. About one-half of this or 12% is sold 
through fried chicken outlets. 
Nearly 80% of all broilers are marketed as iced 
or C02 chilled birds, 13% in chill pack, and 8% as 
frozen broilers.28 Overall, about one-fifth are mar-
keted cut-up; the remainder as whole birds. In the 
case of chill pack broilers, however, cut-ups represent 
about 55 % of the total volume (Figure 5) . 
Since deep chill or chill pack broilers are sold 
entirely through retail stores, they represent nearly 
27From phone conversation and article in Broiler Industry, June 
1971, p. 28. 
20% of the volume sold through retailers. Frozen 
broilers, either raw or pre-cooked, make up only about 
5 % of retail broiler volume. The remaining 7 5 % 
come from iced or C02 chilled broilers. Since iced 
or C02 chilled broilers are distributed unpackaged 
from processors, the majority of consumer packaging 
continues to be performed by retail firms (predomi-
nantly at the store level although gradually shifting to 
the warehouse level) . 
Deep-chill prepackaged broilers have made 
steady though not spectacular gains in acceptance by 
retail operators, indicating a continued shift of the 
cutting and packaging functions from retail firms to 
processors. 29 This trend seems destined for a sharp 
increase due to stiffer sanitation laws for stores and 
central meat plants, increasing store wage rates, and 
an increasing number of potential suppliers of deep 
28Deep chill or chill pack broilers are packaged into consumer 
packages at the processing level under carefully controlled conditions 
of sanitation and refrigeration, crust frozen, and then maintained at 
28° F. until delivered to retail stores. To maintain temperatures of 
28-29° F. throughout distribution, processors have often performed 
the delivery function in their own fleet of trucks. With stringent 
quality control, the shelf life at the retail store is more than ade-
quate for normal sale and consumption requirements. 
This is the most common method used for processor packaged 
broilers, but not the only one. The use of C02 within packages has 
received some experimentation but is not widely used. Still another 
approach is the Crystal Pak used by Bayshore Foods. Both of the 
latter methods utilize less expensive methods of chilling and holding 
packaged broilers than the deep chill process. 
20The staff of Broiler Industry magazine predicts that 50 % of 
all chicken will be packaged at other than retail store levels in 3 
to 5 years. This compares to 20-25 % in 1971 (deep chill and fro-
zen). See Broiler Industry, April 1972, p. 45. 
FIG 5.-Estimated Form in Which Broilers Were Distributed, 1970. 






chill broilers. Holly Farms, the first firm to success-
fully prepackage broilers on a large scale, realized a 
premium of 4 to 5 cents per pound in 1969 for chill 
packed whole birds compared to iced broilers.30 
Delivery of deep chill, ice pack, or C02 chilled 
broilers may be either direct to retail stores or to the 
chain or wholesaler warehouse. While central ware-
housing of meats appears to be increasing, an Ohio 
study indicated that about 80% of the chain and af-
filiated organizations studied had store-door deliver-
ies of broilers. 31 Only in the case of large chains was 
an appreciable percentage distributed through the 
chain warehouse. Since relatively few processors 
provide store-door delivery service, chains a~d affili-
ated organizations without central warehousmg often 
depend upon broiler distributors to serve their stores. 
As Figure 3 indicates, the market linkage be-
tween integrators and the various distribution organi-
zations tends to be via -spot transactions. This varies 
considerably, however. Formula pricing arrange-
ments have been tried and are utilized to some ex-
tent.32 These are more workable with chill pack 
broilers in which the processor is packaging with the 
retailer's label. The buyer-seller relationship in this 
case is more stable. Retailers are more reluctant to 
change suppliers for small price differences (in fact 
are unable to in the very short run). Negotiated for-
mula pricing agreements may stay in effect for rela-
tively long periods, with only occasional revisions as 
costs or competitive factors in the broiler system 
change. This type of arrangement does not obviate 
occasional departures from the formula, however, in 
order to relieve inventory buildups at the processor 
level, or for the processor to help with a retail special 
which the retailer wishes to run. 
30A Review of the Federal Company, Equitable Securities, Morton 
and Co., Inc., New York, Dec. 1969, p .. 5. A premium of 4 to 5 
cents was realized on whole birds. A premium of 8 to l 0 cents 
was realized for cut-up fryers. Recent conversations with retail meat 
merchandisers suggest that this premium may have been reduced 
some in the 4 yea rs since l 9 69. Recent price quotes indicate a pre-
mium of 3.25 cents on whole birds and 6.75 cents on cut-up fryers. 
31Stout, T. T., M. H. Hawkins, and B. W. Marion. Oct. 1968. 
Meat Procurement and Distribution by Ohio Grocery Chains and Af-
filiated Wholesalers. Res. Bull. 1014, Ohio Agri. Res. and Dev. Cen-
ter, Wooster, p. 5. 
32formula pricing arrangements provide for prices which are a 
stipulated amount above or below a recognized market price (for 
example, Chicago iced broilers). The price quotatio~s for l day are 
often used to determine the formula base for the entire week. Under 
this arrangement, the function of the retail buyer is. simplifie_d to 
quantity and timing arrangements. The force~ of in~rt1a are ev1de~t 
in formula pricing arrangements. During earlier periods when suffi-
cient live broilers were traded to allow meaningful market quotations, 
live broiler prices (which the retail bu~~r could then conv~rt to ready-
to-cook prices) were used as the basis for form~la buying a~range­
ments. Live broiler quotations from North Carolina or Georgia con-
tinue to be popular as the price base for formula arrangements, even 
though live prices are based on industry estimates of the value of 
live birds, using a ready-to-cook market price as a s.tandar~. For 
example, one formula used to estimate the value of live broilers at 
a particular location is: . . . 
1 Price of RTC Iced Broilers, Chicago - Freight to Chicago - 8 1/2 ¢/lb. 
for processing costs, shrink, and profit X .73 [dressing percentage) == 
Estimated Value of Live Broilers 
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Formula pricing has been somewhat less success-
ful with iced or C02 chilled broilers which are un-
packaged and undifferentiated. 33 While formulas 
have been tried, the processor is in a more vulnerable 
position since retailers can easily change suppliers. 
In up markets, the processor finds himself bound to a 
formula which prevents him from charging as much as 
he might without a formula, and on down markets, ·his 
retail customers can often find other suppliers who 
will sacrifice in order to unload. From the processors' 
standpoint, formula pricing is equitable only during 
a relatively stable market.34 
Vertical integration or forward purchase con-
tracts are rarities in linking distribution firms with 
the rest of the broiler system. The Kroger Co. has 
recently acquired an integrated broiler complex to 
provide part of its retail requirements. Kentucky 
Fried Chicken entered into broiler production in 1968 
and expanded further in 1972. However their -proc-
essing plants supply only 5-10% of the total sales of 
the nearly 4,000 Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets. 
At least in part, Kentucky Fried Chicken's broiler 
production operations are viewed as a hedge against 
price risks. With fixed retail selling prices, the com-
pany is particularly sensitive to periodic high prices 
for fresh chickens. By being involved in broiler pro-
duction, high broiler prices and integrator profits 
during certain periods will help offset lower retail 
profits, and vice versa. · 
Kentucky Fried Chicken, has further hedged its 
price risk by negotiating 12-month forward purcha~e 
contracts with other broiler processing plants. Their 
vulnerability to fluctuating broiler prices is thus re-
duced by the use of three procurement methods: their 
own production, forward purchase contracts, and spot 
transactions. 35 
Time Dimension. Adding a time dimension to 
the various functions and stages of the broiler system 
provides added insight into the dynamics of the sys-
tem. Both coordination and adjustments in the sys-
tem are heavily influenced by the temporal aspects 
of various decisions and tasks. Figure 6 reflects the 
time dimensions discovered by Tobin and Arthur in 
1963. Relatively minor changes in time interval have 
occurred since their study. 
33While most iced or C02 ·broilers are undifferentiated, this is not 
universally true. Foster ·Farms in California has a well-established 
brand identity for its broilers in the San Francisco market, and Perd~e 
Foods has more recently established its brand in the New York City 
market, using wing tags. See later section on product differentiation 
for elaboration. 
34Although two-thirds of the organizations studied in the ?~io 
study (Stout, et al., op cit., p. 19) reported the use of forn:ula pn~ing 
on broilers in 1964-65, interviews during 1970 of a wider var.1ety 
of organizations indicated formulas are infrequently used for 1~ed 
and C02 broilers. The feeling that formula arrangements provide 
"always a ceiling, but never a floor" has stimulated. pr~cessors to 
move away from formula type arrangements with retail firms. 
35See Broiler Industry, June 1972, p. 50, and July 1972, p. 24. 
FIG. 6-Broiler Production Time Intervals (Time 
Cycle, Starting with Receipt by Basic Breeder or His As-
sociate of .an Order for New Hatchery Flock Chicks).* 
From shipment of primary setting 
eggs to hatchery to placing of 
chick in hatchery supply flock: 
for egg shipment 
to handle at hatchery 
to incubate 
to sex and sort 
to deliver chick to flock 
·Total for this stage 
From placement of chick in hatch-
ery supply flock to delivery of 
commercial broiler hatching eggs 
to hatc:hery: · 
days to pullet's first egg 
typical laying period 
to sort and deliver to hatchery 
Total for this stage 
From receipt of broiler hatching egg 
to delivery of chick to broiler house: 
to handle egg at hatchery 
to incubate 
to grade, de-beak 
to vaccinate and deliver 
Total for this stage 
From placing of chick in broiler 
house to delivery of 3.4 lb. live 
broilers to dressing plant: 
days to reach ~.4 lb., including 
few hours delay 
From arrival of broilers at dressing 
plant to loading for shipment to 
warehouse or store 
Total time affecting finished broiler 
production 
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280 (to first impact) 
525 (to final impact) 
This figure does not deal sufficiently with the 
time dimensions· of the primary breeder. The 26 
days shown from receipt of order to the delivery of 
chicks to hatchery supply flocks is only possible if the 
breeding companies have sufficient multiplier flocks 
to immediately fill such orders. 
Expansions and contractions at the breeder level 
require considerable time. Breeders interviewed 
said they worked on a 3 to 5-year planning schedule. 
This planning horizon is necessary to expand or con-
tract their pedigree program, and to develop multi-
plier flocks incorporating the minor strain improve-
ments continually being developed. The multiplier 
process is approximately as follows: 36 
Improved 1 40 
Strain Hen in. Female 
After the cross is made in the genetic research 
lab and a female chick hatched for the pedigree flock, 
at least 18 months are required before chicks can be 
placed with integrators from the multiplier flocks. 
(Offspring of the pedigree flock could be placed with 
integrators before this for test purposes, but this saps 
off chicks which would otherwise be going to multi-
plier flocks and thus are rather costly test birds.) 
Assuming 8 months to raise chicks to laying age and 
an 8-month period of egg production for both the 
pedigree £.lock and the multiplier flocks, plus nearly 
a month for egg handling, hatching, and chick hand-
ling at two points in the breeder's multiplication proc-
ess, the chicks hatched for the pedigree flock require 
planning for chick sales 18-34 months ahead. Fig-
ure 7 shows these time requirements graphically. 
Early placements are often for field testing by 
integrators. Field tests involve another 9 to 10 
months before the integrator is able to evaluate the 
performance of the new birds in the hatchery supply 
flock and as parents of grown-out broilers. Thus, it 
is likely to be 27 months or more from the time a 
chick carrying some improvement is hatched at the 
primary breeders until field test results from custo-
mers are available. 
Decisions to cycle out an existing strain and re-
place it with an improved modification do not depend 
entirely on the field tests of integrators. Tests con-
ducted by the breeders themselves play an important 
role, and provide more lead time than the results of 
integrator field tests. Once the decision has been 
made to commercially market an improved bird, some 
time is required to develop sufficient grandparent 
stock to handle volume orders for the bird. 
The foregoing summarizes the approximate time 
dimensions of primary breeding companies. While 
they definitely work with certain biological time con-
straints, the time requirement may vary considerably 
from the minimums suggested if problems are encoun-
tered at certain points. 
*Source: Tobin, B. F. and H. B. Arthur. 1964. Dynamics of Ad-
justment in the Broiler Industry. Division of Research, Graduate 
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, p. 48. 
860nce a new or improved strain is developed at the genetic 
research lab, the rest of the multiplication process is necessary in 
order to provide capacity for commercial sales. No additional cross-
breeding is involved until the hatchery supply flock level, where one 
company's females are crossed with that or another company's male 
birds to produce broiler chicks. 
1,600 128,000 
Female Chicks Broiler 
Developed Pedigree Chicks for Sold to Chicks 
at Flock Multiplier Integrator's for 
Genetic (Great- Flock Pa rent Flocks Grow-out· 
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At the integrator level, the planning horizon is 
somewhat shorter. However, a decision to expand 
the hatchery supply flocks will not _result in increased 
broilers coming off stream until 90i months later. And 
the production resulting from such a decision will con-
tinue to influence broiler output until 170i months 
later. An 18-month planning horizon is not unusual. 
While changes in the hatchery supply flock are the 
most desirable and most fundamental method of ad-
justment, other means of adjusting the futur·e flow of 
broilers include: 
• extending or contracting the laying period of 
hatchery supply flocks 
• directing hatching eggs into other channels 
(table egg, breaking, etc.) 
• tightening or loosening the standards for 
hatchable eggs, or for placeable broiler chicks 
• selling or purchasing broiler chicks. 
The above largely involve short-term adjustment 
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sources than adjustments at the supply flock level. 
However, since estimates of demand 9-18 months in 
advance are frequently less than perfect, these proce-
dures are useful for more immediate adjustments. 
These adjustment procedures take place before 
the grow-out operation. Once chicks are placed with 
growers, in all but rare cases they are grown to mar-
ket weight (approximately 3.5 lb. live) and processed. 
At this point additional adjustments may occur to 
balance integrator supplies with orders from distribu-
tors. Inter-integrator sales of live or processed broil-
ers occur to some extent, although no figures are 
available to indicate the magnitude of such transfers. 
Tyson Foods, for example, reportedly grow more 
broilers than needed for their market outlets, and 
hence sell some to other processors. Holly Farms, on 
the other hand, market more birds than they grow.37 
Industry representatives estimated that such 
transactions have declined and are relatively unim-
37Broiler Industry, June 1971, p. 18. 
portant for the industry in total. Current usage of 
inter-company sales are largely for short-run adjust-
ments from week to week. 
At the distribution level, the time dimension var-
ies by type of establishment. Retail food firms may 
plan their sales strategies 2 to 4 weeks (occasionally 
up to 8 weeks) in advance, but seldom place firm 
orders with processors more than 3 days to a week in 
advance of needs. Since broilers are sold within 2 to 
3 days after receiving them, the time exposure of retail 
firms is very limited. 
Although the planning horizon of institutional 
outlets, fast food restaurants and further processors 
may be somewhat longer than retail grocery organi-
zations, forward contracts are still rather sparsely 
used. Spot transactions continue to characterize the 
linkage between integrators and eating establishments. 
Although contractual arrangements are more fre-
quently used with further processors (soup and potpie 
manufacturers, for example), spot transactions are 
still the dominant method of procurement. One no-
table exception to this pattern is the procurement con-
tract recently developed with 20 processors by Ken-
tucky Fried Chicken. These contracts include a base 
price which is in effect for a 12-month period.38 
Short Run vs. Long Run. Viewing a vertical 
system in different time horizons, two general sets of 
functions emerge. In the short run, where the sys-
tem, institutions, and entities are taken as given, the 
rdevant functions are those necessary to accomplish 
an accepted system objective. The focus is on the 
everyday activities and tasks, on the methods of co-
ordination and routine decisions, within an existing 
vertical system. In the foregoing discussion, the con-
cern was with short and intermediate term functions. 
An existing system and on-going member firms with 
facilities, manpower, and financing were assumed. 
. From a longer time horizon, changes in the sys-
tem occur. The adjustment function becomes more 
apparent.. Firms expand and contract, enter and 
leave the industry. Proprietary and authority struc-
tures are altered. Strategic decisions resulting in re-
deployment of firm assets; changes in the system's ob-
jectives, organization, and coordination; and changes 
in the institutions and arrangements influencing the 
system all come into clear focus as critical dimensions 
of an evolving, adaptive commodity system. In the 
long run, adjustment and strategy functions enter the 
scene. These too are tasks to be done-and very criti-
cal ones. They are performed by the top levels of 
management and in some cases by governmental agen-
cies. 
At the same time, the adjustment function of a 
system is inescapably related to its more routine func-
38Broiler Industry, June 1972, p. 50, and July 1972, p. ·24. 
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tions. Conflicts and imbalances occurring in the per-
formance of routine functions are often the catalyst 
for adjustment decisions of a strategic nature. 
Neil Chamberlain commented on the difficult 
balance between routine and strategic functions of a 
firm. 39 
" ... the business firm is constantly subject to two 
pressures which must be maintained in some sort of 
balance. There must always be a tendency toward 
systematic, coherent, efficient organization if the 
firm's existing goals are to be achieved and if the com-
plex of relationships is to be held together at the pres-
ent point in time. There must always be a tendency 
toward a state of equilibrium. At the same time, 
there must also be a tendency toward a breakup of 
existing relationships and the formation of new ones, 
because of the intrusion of unavoidable environmental 
changes and the firm's purposiveness with respect to 
them. There must be a tendency toward disturbing 
present relations, toward introducing an element of 
disequilibrium. 
". . . Without systematic coordination, the firm 
cannot survive in its present environment. Without 
taking actions now looking to a changed system of 
relationships, the organization cannot survive beyond 
the present." 
Both types of functions are important. Because 
of their interdependency, an understanding of one 
type is greatly facilitated by an understanding of the 
other. In even stronger terms, an understanding of 
the routine functions of a system is required in order to 
understand the adjustment functions. 
So far, the routine functions performed by the 
broiler system and the proprietary organizations per-
forming such functions have been discussed. No at-
tempt was made to specify in complete detail the 
functions involved since many are self-evident when 
the structure of authority is understood. 
Much of the focus has been on the physical func-
tions involved in the vertical broiler system; i.e., 
hatching, chick delivery, grow-out, broiler assembly, 
processing, etc. Obviously, these must be supported 
by auxiliary functions such as financing, information 
gathering, etc. 
It is useful to consider the central flow of the 
product and the physical functions involved as the 
main stream of the vertical system. At each stage, 
tributaries feeding in other functional inputs con-
tribute to the product of the main stream. The sys-
tem is an integrative process-the synthesis of re-
sources, products, and services to satisfy the objectives 
of the system. In the short run, the control and co-
ordination of this integrative process is a primary de-
39Chamberlain, Neil W. 1968. Enterprise & Environment, Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Co., New York, p. l 0. 
terminant of the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
system. In the long run, the adaptive characteristics 
of the system take on great·er importance as the system 
responds to both internal and external pressures for 
change. Just how the system responds is one of the 
main concerns of the present effort. 
Spatial Dimensions. The performance of the 
various functions in the vertical broiler complex is 
also influenced by geographic factors. The broiler 
grow-out function is now heavily concentrated in the 
South Atlantic and South Central regions (Figure 8) . 
Eighty-nine percent of the broiler_production occurred 
in these regions in 1971. The South Central region 
alone has expanded its share since 1950; all other re-
gions have declined in their proportion of U.S. broiler 
production (Table 1) . Differences in the availability 
of alternative employment opportunities, the willing-
ness to take directions from someone else, and differ-
ences in input costs (particularly of feed) appear to 
have been the most important factors in the redistri-
bution of broiler production.40 
40An interregional competition study by the University of Mary-
land estimated the 1967 cost of producing and marketing broilers in 
Delmarva (Delaware and Maryland) and eight other major broiler 
states. Compared to Delmarva, the comparative advantage for other 
states was 2.6 to 3.4 cents per pound (RTC) for five states (Arkansas, 
Georgia, North Carolina, Mississippi, and Alabama), and 0.1 to 1.6 
cents per pound for the other three (Texas, Maine, and Virginia). 
Low costs of production generally accounted for much of the differ-
ence. See Via, James and John Crothers. March 1970. The Del-
marva Poultry Industry in Interregional Competition, M. P. 750, Agri. 
Exp. Sta., University of Maryland, College Park, Md. 
FIG. 8.-Number of Broilers and Other Meat-Type Chickens Sold, 1969. 
SOUTH · .... 
CENTRAL.:i·· 
Source: Poultry and Egg Situation, Economic Research Service, U.S.D.A., Nov. 1972. 
1 DOT = 500,000 BIRDS 
48 STATE TOTAL - 2,428,341,026 
TABLE 1.-Regional Shares in Production of Broilers, for Selected Years, 1950-71. 
Regions 1950 1955 1959 1964 1967 1971 
North Atlantic 13 13 6 6 5 5 
East North Central 8 7 5 3 2 1 
West North Central 4 4 3 2 l 
South Atlantic 47 43 42 43 43 41 
South Central 20 27 36 42 45 48 
Western 8 6 5 4 4 4 
United States 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Poultry & Egg Situation. Nov. 1968. PES 254, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, p. 1 O; also 
Chicken and -Eggs. April 1972. Statistical Reporting Service, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, p. 10. 
19 
Only ten states accounted for 84% of the broil-
ers produced in 1971 (Table 2). Arkansas has re-
placed Georgia as the leading broiler-producing state. 
The next most important 12 states produce 13% of 
the nation's broilers, leaving only 3% being produced 
by the remaining 28 states. Figure 9 shows the sur-
plus-deficit position of states in 1967. 
As these data suggest, southern states clearly 
dominate broiler production in the U.S. Some farm-
ers who entered broiler production under relatively 
TABLE 2.-Ten States Leading in Broiler Production, 1965-71, by Rank in 1971. 
1965 1967 1969 
Million Birds 
Arkansas 320 365 415 
~eorgia 403 447 442 
Alabama 285 325 353 
North Carolina 234 263 281 
Missis~ippi 168 197 221 
Maryland 145 151 174 
Texas 142 161 171 
Delaware 109 127 134 
California 60 69 77 
Maine 68 74 73 
Ten State Tota I 1,935 2, 180 2,339 
United States 2,334 2,591 2,787 
Percent 
Ten States as Percentage 
of United States 83 84 84 
Source: The Chicken Broiler Industry. May 1971. MRR 930, ERS, USDA, p. 6; also Poultry and Egg Situation. 
















FIG. 9.-Surplus-Defkit P1osition of Sta·~es in Mim.on Pounds of Ready-to-C:ook Broiler Meat, 
1967 .. 
~~ 
Source: Via, James and John Crothers. March 1970. The Delmarva Poµltry Industry in Interregional Competition. MP 750, Univ. of 
Maryland, Agri. Exp. Sta., College Park, Md., p. 9. 
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attractive conditions have found exiting more diffi-
cult. 
"In the early 1950's many underemployed farm-
ers throughout the South were given an opportunity 
to produce broilers under contract. About all they 
needed to do was build a broiler house. Buildings in 
that period were of low-cost construction, pole-type 
housing (constructed with homegrown lumber in 
many cases) and covered with rolled composite roof-
ing material. Nearly all houses had dirt floors. 
Many farmers were able to improve their economic 
positions through broiler growing, especially those en-
gaged in small cotton or other crop enterprises."41 
"Limited alternative uses for existing investments 
in broiler enterprises and limited off-farm employ-
ment, principally in the South, have kept many farm-
ers in broiler production in spite of excess capacity 
and generally low returns."42 
Because the broiler integrator distributes chicks, 
feed, and other inputs to the grow-out operations, pro-
vides field supervision, and collects the grown birds 
for delivery to the processing plant, significant eco-
nomies can be realized when grow-out areas are con-
centrated. Henry, et al. indicated in 1960: 
"Each mile added to the average one-way length 
of haul between broiler farms and central servicing 
and processing facilities increases total costs of chick 
delivery, feed delivery, fieldman assistance, and live-
ha uling by about 1.4 cents per 100 lb. of live birds."43 
This is, servicing flocks 50 miles away would cost 
the integrator 0.7 cents per pound more than servi-
cing a flock adjacent to his facilities. With profit 
margins typically less than 0.5 cents per pound, this 
difference is indeed significant. This source also 
concluded: 
"Optimum processing plant size depends upon 
production density of the supply area, but total costs 
do not change sharply with changes in plant sizes. 
Plant size is not as critical as production density in 
determining the competitive positions of broiler proc-
essors and associated businesses."44 
This has resulted in a rather natural division of 
supply areas within some states, with individual inte-
grators concentrating their activities and facilities 
around a central location. ·This appears to be more 
frequently the case in the South Central region than 
in the Delmarva area. Spatial concentration by in-
41P & SA-1, The Broiler Industry, Packers & Stockyards Adminis-
tration, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, August 1967, p. 13. 
•. 
42fbid., p. 14. 
43Henry, William R., Joe Chappell, and James A. Seagraves. 
June 1960. Production Density, Plant Size, Alternative Operating 
Plans and Total Unit Costs. Tech. Bull. 144, North Carolina Agri. 
Exp. Sta. 
44 1bid., p. 3. 
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tegrators carries economic benefits to the integrator, 
but may provide fewer alternative partners for contract 
growers.45 
Harold Breimyer states: "If, as many predict 
and some fear, the broiler industry becomes concen-
trated in a few hands, the consequences will be far 
reaching. To contract growers, the incisive one will 
be to limit, to circumscribe, the opportunities avail-
able to them."46 · 
A. reduction in the total number of buyers ~oes 
not necessarily result in a decline iJ.?. tp.e number avail-
able to individual growers, or in a de~line in their bar-
gammg power. Br,oiler growers are also declining in 
number and increasing in average size. Good grow-
ers are generally in strong demand. ·And while the 
economic advantages of encouraging concentrated 
production may limit the number of integrators avail-
able to ~dividual growers,' the high cost of transport-
ing feed, chicks, and live broilers also limits the area 
an integrator can economically service. Depending 
upon the demand conditions for broiler growers in ~n 
area, the growers may find t~emselves in strong ·or 
weak bargaining positions. In those areas where 
processing capacity has expanded more rapidly than 
broiler production, keen competition between integra-
tors is. likely in order to attract a sufficient number 
of contract growers. More favorable contracts are 
likely to result. 
In areas where the volume of production from 
willing growers exceeds the demand requirements of 
integrators, the opposite situation may well exist. This 
is particularly likely in areas which are declining in 
production. 
While there are strong economic forces support-
ing geographic concentration by integrators and 
partitioning of supply areas, the extent.to which _such 
a trend is evident could not be determined by the. very 
mixed comments received on this issue. Eastern 
Market Res~arch Service, Inc. found in l966 that 
growers in selected areas of Georgia and ·Alabama 
typically had eight to nine contracting companies 
operating in their area. Nearly all growers in this 
study felt they could change contractors freely. Oth-
er sources of information suggest that this condition 
continued to exist in 1970, with competitidn Jor good 
growers extremely keen. 
45Holly Farms, for example, accept no new growers more than 
50 miles away from processing plants (Broiler Industry, Sept. 1971, 
p. 50). While this appears to be fairly typical for . .ihe industry, 
some integrators are attempting to concentrate growers, within 20 
miles of their processing plants. · 
46Breimyer, Harold. 1965. Individual Freedom and the Economic 
Organization of Agriculture. Univ. of Illinois Press, Urbana, 111., 
p. 217. ( 
Representatives of grower organizations and gov-
ernment agencies take a different position, indicating 
that while good growers do have adequate alterna-
tives, the average and marginal growers often do not. 
Although these differences in opinion are unresolved, 
they raise the issue of the greater value to contracting 
firms of good growers over poor growers. While most 
contracts attempt to reflect the value of different qual-
ities of growers through feed conversion incentives, or 
contracts considering total production costs, these pro-
visions apparently do not reflect fully the differences 
in the value of different growers. 
At present it appears that an integrator may have 
different territorial limits for different quality grow-
ers. For example, he may equate a marginal grower 
5 miles away with an average grower 20 miles away 
and a good grower 50 miles away. If this is true, the 
good grower obviously has many more contractors 
who consider him within their territory. If it is pos-
sible to develop cont~acts accurately reflecting the clif-
f erences in the value of different growers, this would 
be an important step toward increasing the alternatives 
for average and poor growers, and would tend to de-
crease the area served by contracting companies. Since 
some of the benefits from good growers are difficult 
to evaluate in monetary terms ( i. e., reliability, co-
operation, and fewer headaches and uncertainties), 
the development of contracts equalizing the desirabili-
ty of different growers may not be possible. It ap-
pears to merit further investigation, however. 
Some predict the economic benefits from increas-
ing production density will eventually lead to broiler 
factories, in which the breeding flock, hatchery, grow-
out units, feed manufacturing plant, and processing 
plant will all be located at one place and connected 
by automatic transfer equipment.47 Even if this does 
not occur for some time, it seems likely that future 
grow-out units wm increasingly be located closer to 
the "integrator input-supplying and processing units. 
The Horizontal Structure of Various Stages in 
the ¥ertical System. At the same time the broiler 
system has become vertically more compact, horizon-
tal concentration has also taken place at all levels. 
At the primary breeder level, industry representatives 
estimate that three female breeders sell nearly 90% 
of the female chicks, and that four male breeders rep-
resent a similar share of the cockerel market in the 
United States. The president of one breeding com-
pany has predicted that by 1975 the poultry breeding 
business will be in the hands of 10 firms worldwide. 
An estimated 40 million breeder chicks were sold 
in the United States in 1969, of which 35 million were 
47Garren, Henry. Feb. 1967. One Million Broilers a Week on 
400 Acres. Broiler Industry, pp. 70-72. 
females. In numbers, the market for female breeder 
chicks is approximately seven times the size of the 
cockerel chick market. Cockerel chicks sell for three 
to four times the price of pullet chicks, however, re-
sulting in a U. S. dollar market for cockerels roughly 
one-half the size of that for pullet chicks. It should 
be noted that the genetic research costs in developing 
a male breeding line are similar to those in developing 
a female line, even though the size of markets differs 
substantially. 
In the U. S., Arbor Acres (subsidiary of IBEC) 
and Van tress Farms (subsidiary of Artnell Co.) are 
the leading breeders of female and male chicks, re-
spectively. Each of these companies captures ap-
proximately 50% of their respective markets. While 
these two companies have worked independently in 
the U. S., they operated jointly in penetrating foreign 
markets until Dec. 1971. The package deal thus pro-
vided to foreign customers was an important incentive 
for other American breeders to develop both male and 
female chicks in order to compete. Pilch Co. (now 
Pilch-DeKalb) , for example, developed a cockerel in 
1966 in order to compete in foreign markets with 
Cobb and Hubbard (both of whom had male and fe-
male lines), as well as the Arbor Acres-Vantress joint 
program.48 
While market share figures for world breeder 
chick sales are unavailable, the smaller U. S. breeders 
have apparently been more successful in adapting to 
the needs and requirements of broiler production in 
foreign countries than in the United States. One in-
dustry representative suggested that the smaller com-
panies moved faster and more aggr·essively in develop-
ing foreign markets, in part because of their size and 
compact management and in part because they were 
willing to sacrifice short-term profits for a longer run 
market position. In the case of some of the smaller 
breeders, their overseas operations may actually be 
supporting their domestic operations. 
Because different vertical broiler systems are en-
countered in various foreign countries, the functions 
performed and the method of organization of U. S. 
breeders varies considerably in their overseas opera-
tions. In some cases, grandparent flocks are estab-
lished which are owned and operated by the U. S. 
firm. More typically, however, chicks for grandpar-
ent flocks are sold to franchisees in the host country, 
who then perform the remaining multiplication and 
sales functions. Henry Saglio of Arbor Acres indi-
cated that in many foreign countries, hatcheries, feed 
mills, and processing plants tend to be tied together, 
but that the grow-out operation and hatchery supply 
48Based upon telephone interviews with Chester Pilch of Pilch-
DeKalb and Henry Saglio of Arbor Acres. 
flocks are usually independently operated. He ex-
pects this pattern to continue for some time. Arbor 
Acres had broiler and/ or egg operations in 23 coun-
tries in 1971. In some of the less developed countries, 
they have found it necessary to develop and operate 
the entire vertical complex; i.e., they have assumed 
the functions of the U. s.·broiler integrator, as well as 
performing the breeding functions. 
Concentration at the integrator level in the U. S. 
has also increased but remains much lower than at the 
primary breeder level. Using the pounds slaughtered 
as an indicator of size, Table 3 shows the increasing 
concentration that occurred from 1960 to 1968. The 
largest integrator in 1968, Ralston Purina Co. proc-
essed an estimated 5.6% of the nation's broilers that 
year.49 In late 1971, Purina's dramatic decision to 
dispose of its broiler complexes left Holly Farms and 
Gold Kist as the estimated volume leaders. 
The largest 20 firms, 18 of which slaughtered 1 % 
or more of the U. S. total, accounted for 47% of the 
broilers processed, and the 45 largest firms slaughtered 
two-thirds of the nation's broilers in 1968.50 A total of 
153 firms processed broilers in 1968. Concentration 
has increased at the integrator level, although slowly 
since 1964. Compared to other food manufacturing 
industries, the present concentration level is relatively 
low. 
The structure at the distribution level of the 
broiler system varies by type of distributor. The 
structure of food retailing is slightly less concentrated 
than at the integrator level. For example, the 20 
largest retail food chains captured 40% of the U. S. 
grocery sales in 1970.51 However, the structure of 
49Henry, William R. August 1969. 1969 Ranking of U. S. 
Broiler Plant Leaders. Broiler Industry, p. 26. 
501bid., p. 26; also PES 259, Poultry & Egg Situation, ERS, USDA, 
Nov. 1969, pp. 10-11. 
~Market Structure of the Food Industries. MRR 971, ERS, USDA, 
Sept. 1972, p. 96. 
TABLE 3.-Shares of Federally Inspected Young 
Chickens Slaughtered and Number of Plants Operated 
by the Four, Eight, and Twenty Largest Firms.* 
Four Eight Twenty Total Number of 
Largest Larges~ Largest Federally Inspected 
Year Firms Firms Firms Processing Entities 
Percent Slaughtered No. of Firms 
1960 12 18 32 286 
1964 18 28 44 201 
1968 18 29 47 153 
Number of Plants Operated 
1960 21 31 52 288** 
1964 36 51 80 
1968 31 48 84 274 
*Federally inspected plants accounted for 90 % of the U. S. pro-
duction of young chickens in· 1968. 
**For 1962. 
Source: Faber, F. L. and William W. Gallimore. Nov. 1964. 
Changes in Firm and Plant Size in Broiler and ·Turkey Processing. In 
PES-259, ERS, USDA. 
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the fried chicken fast-food industry is highly concen-
trated, with the largest firm, Kentucky Fried Chicken 
(a subsidiary of Heublein as of 1971), representing 
65 to 80% of this industry's sales.52 Approximately 
75% of KFC's volume is sold through franchised out-
lets. While all broilers are purchased to KFC speci-
fications, retail outlets buy in some cases from local 
processors, in some cases from distributors who have a 
procurement franchise with KFC, and in some cases 
from company-owned distribution centers. 
Other types of food service operations are pre-
dominantly single unit organizations. In 1967, 77% 
of the sales of eating establishments (which constitute 
about 50% of the total food service market) were 
realized by single unit firms. This share is declin-
ing, however, as multi-unit organizations such as 
Howard J ohnsons, McDonalds and Kentucky Fried 
Chicken have captured an increasing share of this 
market. In 1967, firms with 11 or more units repre-
sented 5 % of all eating places, but accounted for 
14% of sales.53 
Concentration ratios, by themselves, tell relative-
ly little about the dynamics of the broiler industry. 
In combination with other factors, however, they can 
provide useful insights. Two additional market 
structure variables normally considered by economists 
to· influence industry conduct and performance are 
the degree of product differentiation and· the level of 
entry barriers. These variables also warrant exam-
ination. 
Product Differentiation:54 With a few exceptions, 
broilers are generally sold to consumers under the re-
tail store's label. Foster Farms in California and Per-
due Foods on the East Coast are two of the better 
known exceptions. Both h~ve successfully differen-
tiated ice packed birds identified with wing tags. Per-
due, for example, entered the New York City market 
with 50,000 broilers per week around the beginning 
of 1969. Concentrating on independent stores and 
small chains, and using heavy radio and TV adver-
52KFC sold an estimated 750 million lb. of broilers in fiscal 1971, 
or 10.3 % of U. S. production. (See Broiler Industry, Oct. 1971 and 
July 19·72.) The proportion of all broilers sold through fast food 
and carryout restaurants is estimated at 12 to 15 % by industry and 
government sources. (See MRR 971, p. 49.) 
53ln 1969, $35 billion worth of food and non-alcoholic beverages 
was consumed away from home. Of this total, $10.5 billion (30 
percent) was consumed at institutions, and $24.0 billion (70 percent) 
at public food service firms. Separate eating places, in which the 
sale of food was the primary source of revenue, accounted for 68 
percent of public food service sales. See MRR 971, op. cit., pp. 103-
108. 
54A product is defined from the perspective of potential buyers. 
Thus, the physical properties of a product may only partly define it; 
a more complete view is the bundle of utilities perceived by buyers. 
following this interpretation, Product A is differentiated from Product 
B if the two products are perceived by some buyers to represent dif-
ferent bundles of utilities. Those buyers who perceive that Product 
A more nearly satisfies their wants will prefer Product A to Product 
B. One measure of the degree of this preference is the price differ-
ence required to achieve indifference. 
tising, Perdue's volume grew to an estimated 700,000 
broilers per week in mid-1971. This represented more 
than 50% of the butcher trade in New York City.55 
Efforts to establish processor brands have fre-
quently· involved persuading two audiences, consum-
ers and retail meat personnel, of the superior nature 
of a particular brand of broilers. Accustomed to 
thinking of broilers as a commodity, retail meat per-
sonnel must be convinced through a variety of means 
that broilers can be converted into an advertised 
branded product which at least in part is pre-sold to 
consumers. To accomplish this, a variety of adver-
tising and promotional programs have been tried. 
Some of the more successful ones have involved care-
ful selection of media and programs so that retail 
meat personnel are exposed to ads beamed at consu-
mer.s. Sponsoring baseball or football broadcasts, 
for example, may be an inefficient means of reaching 
homemakers, but an effective means of reaching re-
tail meat cutters. 
In addition to advertising campaigns, other in-
gredients ·of some of the successful efforts to establish 
processor brands have included: providing point of 
purchase material to retailers, conducting educational 
programs with retail personnel on· effective methods 
of merchandising broilers, and maintaining high qual-
ity standards and a streamlined distribution system 
which produces colder, fresher, lower bacteria count 
broilers with fewer processing defects. 
One of the problems faced by processors attempt-
ing to establish a consumer franchise for their brand 
of ice pack broilers is maintaining brand identity of 
the birds. Wing tags have proven reasonably suc-
cessful with broilers sold whole. When cut up at the 
retail· store, however, the wing tags are frequently 
discarded by retail personnel. 
In addition, consumers have difficulty in detect-
ing quality differences in broilers. Even though 
higher quality standards are maintained, consumers 
may not recognize or appreciate the superiority of the 
product. For the_se reasons, the critical importance 
of differentiating broilers to the retail trade is under-
standable. Successfully ·differentiating br~nded broi.1-
ers to consumers and/ or the retail trade places the 
proces~or in a much stronger position ill negotiating 
with retail customers. Price premiums of 1 to 4 cents 
per.pound over other iCe pack broi~ers have been real-
ized. Even with these premiums, there are some who 
question whether the processors involved are any more 
profitable than they would be if they had· stayed with 
cord woo_d. ·· With .. no data available to resolve the 
issue, one can only surmis·e that th~ firms involved are 
55Broiler Industry Editorial Previews, May 1971, Garden State 
Publishing Co., Sea Isle City, N. J. Fifty percent of the butcher trade 
represents about 15 % of the total New York City market. 
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either realizing or expect to realize some profit benefits 
or they would soon abandon their efforts. 
Other integrators have effectively differentiated 
their broilers to distributors by packaging at the proc-
essing plant. The development of deep-chill, proc-
essor-packed broilers by Holly Farms provided defi-
nite advantages to retailers by transferring the cutting 
and packaging functions back to the processor. Other 
integrators have since developed similar products, re-
sulting in Holly Farms losing some of its differential 
advantage. Except for some recent efforts by a few 
integrators on a limited scale, chill pack broilers have 
been packaged with the retailer's label, not the proc-
essor's. Thus, any consumer franchise which has 
been developed has centered on the retailer. Unless 
this trend is reversed, as more proceswrs provide chill 
pack products, the premium over ice packed boilers is 
likely to decline to reflect the cost of cutting and pack-
aging broilers at the processing plant, plus the added 
value of chill pack broilers due to lower moisture con-
tent. 
The above examples refer to a relatively small 
proportion of the fresh broilers marketed (about one-
fifth of those sold through retail stores) . The re-
mainder of the broilers sold through retail food firms 
are very much a commodity in nature. Sold on a 
plant or federal grade basis, the retail buyer can easily 
change suppliers if. dissatisfied with quality control, 
price, or delivery services. 
Broilers sold through restaurants and institutions 
provide an opportunity to differentiate through the 
cooking procedure. Kentucky Fried Chicken, for ex-
ample, has established a strong brand identity among 
consumers. In selling to such accounts, integrators 
can gain some differential advantage by the size and 
uniformity of their birds. Fried chicken operators 
prefer small and uniform broilers for portion ·and cost 
control purposes. The difficulty in obtaining ade-
quate supplies of birds of the desired size and uniform-
ity has be~n one of the reasons given by Kent_ucky 
Fried Chicken for its acquisition of production and 
processing operations.56 
Moving back to the breeder level, significant 
product differentiation is found in the chicks sold to 
integrators for their hatchery supply flocks. The 
price of chicks is relatively unimportant. Integrator 
purchase decisions depend, instead, on the perform-
ance of the birds both in the hatchery supply flocks 
(liveability, nervousness, rate of lay, etc.), and as 
56See Broiler Industry, Nov. 1968, p. 58; August, 1969, p. 12; 
Sept. 1969, p. 20; and July 1972, p. 24. 
At least one integrator contends that price· was more of a factor 
than adequate supplies of small uniform birds. Weighing devices 
at many processing plants allow sorting of birds into very narrow 
weight classes. Since small birds are more expensive per pound to 
produce, integrators are reluctant to accept orders for small birds 
without an adequate premium. 
parents of broiler chicks (rate of gain, feed conver-
sion, disease susceptibility, ease of sexing, etc.) . The 
large number of performance criteria involved may be 
weighted differently by different integrators, and in 
fact may be of varying importance to different types 
of operations. Differentiation depends upon the 
types of trade-offs integrators are willing to make and 
the importance placed on certain performance char-
acteristics. In most cases, more than one breed of 
female or male chicks is utilized by an integrator. 
Sinc_e breeders continually make modifications 
in their chicks and integrators adjust their perform-
ance criteria, the competitive balance shifts to some 
extent over time. Entirely new birds are introduced 
rarely, however, (one in 20 years, for example) so 
that drarp.atic shifts in breeder competitive advantages 
are relatively infrequent. 
The breeders' service and assistance programs 
are integral parts of their efforts to gain a differen--
tial advantage. The performance of their chicks is 
strongly influenced by environmental and manage-
ment factors at the grow-out and hatchery supply 
flock. The extent to which breeder fiddmen are 
able to encourage integrator practices which bring 
out all that has been bred into their chicks may well 
determine how their chicks are evaluated. 
Barriers to Entry: Caves defines three general 
types of entry barriers. 57 These are: scale economies, 
absolute cost barriers, and product differentiation. 
An appraisal of the three enterprise levels of the 
broiler industry suggests that barriers are moderate 
to high at the primary breeder level, and low to mod-
erate at the integrator and distributor levels. Prod-
. uct differentiation is unimportant as a barrier except 
at the breeder level, where it is largely dependent up-
51Caves, Richard. 1967. American Industry: Structure, Conduct, 
and Performance. Second Edition. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., pp. 22-28. 
on the genetic development of breeder chicks. Thus, 
the barrier is largely due to the technical ability and 
time investment of existing breeders. (One breeder 
estimated it would take 8 to 10 years to develop and 
market an entirely new bird.) A successful breed is 
carefully controlled and continuously upgraded as 
new developments are introduced. 
Because of the heavy investment in genetic re-
search, and the time required to develop experience 
and a gene pool) primary breeding companies are char-
acterized by high fixed costs and low variable costs. 
This represents a situation where significant economies 
of scale are present; a situation which has led to the 
demise of several small breeders, to expansion in for-
eign countries, and to the present high level of concen-
tration. Entry into primary breeding has tended to 
occur through mergers for very logical reasons. 
Economies of scale, although definitely present, 
are not as important at the integrator level as at the 
primary breeder level. Table 4 indicates the average 
cost. per bird in 1964 for different volume operations 
for four of the integrator's functions. Feed mixing 
and distribution costs are not shown, but follow a 
similar pattern.58 
As this table shows, the optimum scale of output 
is dependent upon the density of broiler production. 
At a density of 1000 lb. of broilers per square mile per 
year, costs were minimized in an operatio:g_ putting 
out 7 million birds per year. Regardless of density, 
economies were small beyond 9.9 million birds per 
year. This volume would represent about 0.33% of 
1969 broiler production. 
58See Burbee, C. R., E. T. Bardwell, and A. A. Brown. Sept. 1965. 
Marketing New England Poultry. 7. Economics of Broiler Feed Mix-
ing and Distribution. Bull. 484, Agri. Exp. Sta., Univ. of New Hamp-
shirt, Durham. As the figures from these studies suggest, there are 
diseconomies from dispersed, low density patterns of production. It 
should be noted, however, that biological uncertainties mean increased 
disease risks from highly concentrated and very dense patterns of 
production. This trade-off is present both in broiler grow-out and 
hatchery supply flock distribution. 
TABLE 4.-Long-run Average Costs for Six Poultry Marketing Systems Operating .at 100 Percent of Capacity 
with Broiler Production at Three Density Levels. 
Broiler Assembly Chick Distribution Combined Costs 
Output Birds Density Level in Pounds* 
System per year Processing Hatching 1,000 5,000 25,000 1,000 5,000 25,000 1,000 5,000 25,000 
(million) -(cents per bird) 
A 1.19 13.311 2.180 3.034 2.230 1.810 .241 .204 .190 18.816 17.925 17.491 
c 3.56 ll.536 1.400 3.343 2.265 1.880 .184 .128 .104 16.463 15.329 14.920 
E 7.ll 10.392 1.174 3.952 2.545 1.901 .208 .ll8 .088 15.726 14.229 13.555 
F 9.88 10.007 1.105 4.393 2.741 1.950 .246 .121 .081 15.751 13.974 13.143 
G 14.82 9.597 I.062 2.989 2.100 .138 .o93 13.786 12.852 
H 19.76 9.247 1.037 3.217 2.289 .134 .090 13.635 12.663 
*Density levels refer to pounds of broilers per square mile per year. 
Source: Burbee, Clark R. and Edwin T. Bardwell. May 1964. Marketing New England Poultry. 6: Economies of Scale in Hatching and 
Cost of Distributing Broiler Chicks. Bull. 483, Agri. Exp. Sta., Univ. of New Hampshire, Durham, p. 45. 
While this picture may have changed some since 
1964, and recognizing also that added scale economies 
may well accrue from multi-plant operation, it still 
appears unlikely that a large share of the broiler mar-
ket is required to realize the economies of scale avail-
able. Note, however, that these economies relate to 
production and processing costs only, not to total firm 
operation. The economies of scale in marketing, fi-
nancing, information systems, etc. are not consid-
ered. 59 Even with these· included, it seems unlikely 
that the economies of scale represent more than a 
modest barrier to entry. 
Operating an integrated broiler firm successfully 
requires definite managerial skills at each stage, and 
in providing overall planning and coordination. Such 
a bundle of managerial and technical ability repre-
sents one of the important entry barriers into the inte-
grated broiler business. Because of this, most firms 
entering this segment of the vertical complex have 
done so through merging with an existing integrator. 
The generally low and unstable profits in the 
broiler industry present a further entry barrier. For 
public corporations, in particular, the mercurial profit 
pattern of the industry tarnishes its attractiveness. 
Compared to other industries, the barriers to en-
try into the integrated broiler industry are not high. 
For many agriculturally related businesses, however, 
59 Robinson suggests that five factors determine the optimum size 
of a business. These are: technical (where minimum costs of produc-
tion are determinable), managerial (where there are eventual diseco-
nomies of coordination), financial (where size contributes to advanta-
geous funding), marketing (an optimum sales unit, including multiple 
products), and risk and fluctuation (related to the power to survive 
industrial vicissitudes). See Robinson, E. A. G. 1964. The Struc-
ture of Competitive Industry. Cambridge Economic Handbook 6, Univ. 
of Chicago Press, pp. 12-93. 
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the management, capital, and risk involved may pose 
a substantial entry barrier. 
This rather abbreviated discussion of the hori-
zontal structure of the three enterprise levels in tp.e 
broiler system provides some additional insights into 
the economic forces operating within the system. One 
additional factor warrants brief comment-the im-
portance of broilers to the various firms involved. 
This ranges from nearly 100% of the firm's business 
for several breeders, some independent or regional in-
tegrators, and some fried chicken firms, to only about 
3% of the sales of retail food stores.60 
No current data are available on the percentage 
of sales attributable to broilers in large diversified 
firms such as Central Soya, Pillsbury, Swift, etc. The 
National Commission on Food Marketing found that 
of the 1964 sales of the first two plus Purina, 12% 
came from poultry and egg sales. The contribution 
of the broiler enterprise to the total value added and 
total profits realized by these companies would more 
accurately reflect the importance of broilers; unfortu-
nately, these figures are not available. 
The proportion of the sales represented by broil-
ers provides some indication of the importance of the 
broiler complex to various firms. Breeders and inte-
grators who are devoted nearly 100% to broilers are 
obviously much more vulnerable to poor times than 
those companies with their eggs in more baskets. Al-
though this might lead one to expect more responsible 
behavior from those companies heavily committed to 
broilers, this has not always been the case. 
6
°Fresh fryers typically represent l 0-14 percent of retail meat 
sales; meat sales generally account for about 22 percent of total 
store sales. 
CHAPTER Ill 
COORDINATING AND REGULATING 
INSTITUTIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS 
The vertical broiler system has historically been 
relatively unencumbered by government regulations 
and programs, particularly compared to other agri-
cultural industries. Price supports, production allot-
ments, and market orders have not been applied to 
broilers. Regulation of supplies and price has been 
left to the participants in the vertical system and a 
competitive market system. The results have not al-
ways been satisfactory from the viewpoint of system 
members due to the frequent price depressions men-
tioned earlier. 
While the broiler system has remained relatively 
free of the supply and price controls evident in many 
commodity systems, a large number of institutions and 
arrangements still influence its behavior. Some of 
these are the market rules affecting all U. S. indus-
tries, such as property rights, the legality of contracts, 
anti-trust regulations, tax regulations, and freight rate 
regulations. Others are services or regulations specif-
ically directed to the broiler complex. Only the lat-
ter will receive comment here. 
Institutions providing information are of par-
ticular importance to the coordination of a market 
regulated industry. The various communication net-
works that relay information on current outlook, new 
technology, etc. are an integral part of the vertical 
broiler system. Some of the more important infor-
mation sources are: 
U.S.D.A. Market News-provides daily reports 
on conditions in six eastern markets, the number and 
size of birds slaughtered in major producing areas, and 
once a week the prices paid in 14 markets for trucklot 
sales of ice packed broilers; also provides a nine-city 
weighted average price each Monday. 
U.S.D.A. Broiler Marketing Guide-published 
quarterly; provides analysis of expected future supply 
and demand conditions and guidelines for industry ad-
justment of hatchery supply flock size and the number 
of broiler chicks placed. · 
U.S.D.A. Poultry and Egg Situation-published 
five times per year; provides a wide array of statistics 
on poultry industries (broilers, eggs, and turkeys) . 
U.S.D.A. Breeder Placement Report-published 
monthly; reports the number of breeder chicks placed 
in hatchery supply flocks. 
U.S.D.A. Chick and Egg Placement Report-
published weekly; reports the number of eggs set and 
broiler chicks placed. 
U.S.D.A. Eggs, Chickens and Turkeys-published 
monthly; provides monthly information on the number 
27 
of broiler chicks hatched and the number of pullet 
chicks placed for hatchery supply flocks. 
Poultry Survey Committee Report-prepared by 
five university economists and published quarterly by 
American Feed Manufacturers Assoc.; provides out-
look information for poultry industries. 
Computone-privately run computerized price 
forecasting system available only to processors on a 
subscription basis; provided a price reporting system 
when first organized, but was later discontinued. 
Urner-Barry Report-privately operated; pro-
vides daily price information for New York market; 
not as widely used for broilers as for eggs. 
Iced Broiler Futures, Chicago Board of Trade-
while not its primary function, the futures market pro-
vides estimates of expected prices for broilers of deliver-
able quality for future months. 
Trade publications-Feedstuffs, Broiler Industry, 
Poultry Meat, Poultry Times, and others; these publi-
cations provide a wide variety of information about 
factors affecting the broiler system. 
University and U.S.D.A. studies-published 
periodically in bulletin form, often providing in-depth 
analysis of some aspect of the broiler system. 
The above sources provide a considerable amount 
of information about the vertical broiler system. In-
dustry personnel have found them of varying value 
and normally supplement such information with their 
own observations and interfirm communications. 
Because a variety of forces influence broiler prices 
in addition to the quantity of broilers marketed, price 
. forecasting efforts have met with mixed results. Dr. 
William R. Henry of Geor'gia State University indi-
cated in a telephone interview that econometric price 
forecasting models have been disappointing in their 
results. Even though Dr. Henry has been able to 
forecast broiler supplies with reasonable accuracy 8 to 
10 months in advance, his price forecasting efforts 
have been frustrating. Tobin and Arthur referred. to 
this problem in their 1964 report: 
"There have been many occasions when.the broil-
er market has been unusually weak or unusually 
strong, considering the supplies of broilers pressing on 
the market. No really satisfactory explanations have 
been forthcoming". 61 
This problem iS reflected in the contents of the 
quarterly Broiler Marketing Guides for 1969 and 
1970. The Sept. 1969 Supplement estimated that a 
6% increase in broilers slaughtered during the first 
61Tobin and Arthur, op. cit., p. 94. 
quarter of 1970 over the first quarter of 1969 would 
result in ready-to-cook wholesale prices of 27 to 29 
cents, approximately the same as the previous year. 62 
Although an increase of not more than 5 % was en-
couraged by the Guide, the industry responded by in-
creasing production about 13 % during the first quar-
ter of 1970. Price estimates in the 1969 Supplement 
had indicated that this large an increase would result 
in prices of 26. to 27 cents. The actual average price 
realized in the first quarter of 1970 was 27.9 cents.63 
For those not acquainted with the broiler system, 
this level of error may appear ~mall. However, broil-
er integrators operate with small profit margins per 
pound. For example, the National Commission on 
Food Marketing found that the median annual net 
income before taxes for broiler processors for the years 
1960 to 1964 varied from 0.12 to 0.33 cents per 
pound. 64 Thus, price estimates erroneous by as much 
as 1 cent provide limited help to the industry. 
The above illustration does not reflect the typical 
accuracy of the U.S.D.A. Broiler Marketing Guide. 
Interviews with industry personnel indicated this was 
one of their most useful sources of outlook informa-
tion. The illustration does indicate two types of 
problems confounding efforts to stimulate greater sta-
bility in the broiler system. The difficulty of accu-
rate price projections is one; the uncertain reaction 
of broiler integrators to outlook and guideline infor-
mation is the other. Collectively, the industry has 
much to gain by attempting to regulate supplies to 
maintain stable and profitable price levels. But in-
dividual integrators may well try to benefit from the 
higher prices they think will result from the restraint 
of their competitors by expanding their output. 
While a few integrators have attempted a degree of 
industry leadership by publicly stating their output 
intentions, 65 the impact of this effort on the industry 
is difficult to assess. 
Other institutions and arrangements have im-
portant effects on the broiler system. Some of these 
are aimed at providing information or protection for 
consumers. The 1957 Poultry Inspection Act, for 
example, made federal inspection mandatory by 1959 
for processing plants engaged in interstate commerce. 
Under the Wholesome Poultry Act of 1968, intrastate 
plants now must conform to the same standards of 
sanitation and wholesomeness as interstate plants. 
Regulations on packaging and labeling also attempt 
62Supplement to 1969 Broiler Marketing Guide, C&MS, USDA, 
Washington, D. C., Sept. 1969, p. 9. 
63PES 261, Poultry and Egg Situation, ERS, USDA, Washington, 
D. C., April 1970, p. 7. 
64National Commission on Food Marketing, Tech. Study 2, 
op. cit., p. 61 . 
65The action of Purina in this respect is noted in the Nov. 1968 
issue of Broiler Industry, p. 22. 
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to ensure that adequate and non-deceptive informa-
tion is provided to consumers. 
Federal grades for broilers are utilized on an op-
tional basis by processors. In large part, federal 
grades ar~ facilitators of communication and ex-
change between buyers and sellers, and only second-
arily information for consumers. USDA Grade A is 
widely used as a standard for exchange and represents 
the majority of the birds graded. Grades B and C 
tend to be traded under the processor's plant grade. 
Since federal grading is optional and is performed on 
a fee basis the extent to which broilers are federally 
' . 
graded varies considerably from one processor to an-
other. 
Pricing and exchange arrangements in the verti-
cal broiler complex have previously received comment. 
Contractual arrangements with specified terms are 
heavily used to link broiler integrators with broiler 
growers and with hatchery supply flock managers. 
While it is commonly recognized that such contracts 
replace spot transactions as a type of bilateral agree-
ment for exchange, contracts should also be noted as 
important catalysts for technological change. By spe-
cifying certain growing conditions, integrators have 
accelerated the adoption of improved housing and cul-
tural .practices. 
Forward sale contracts are used to a limited ex·· 
tent in the sale of broilers to eating establishments and 
further processors, but not to the extent that many 
integrators would like. Formula pricing arrange-
ments, which are not firm contracts but rather agree-
ments on the procedure for determining price if an 
order is placed, are used to some extent between proc-
essors and retailers (particularly for chill pack broil-
ers), but appear to be declining in importance. 
The use of the organized futures market on the 
Chicago Board of Trade, which could stimulate or be 
stimulated by more forward contracting, has been 
somewhat limited at the time of writing at all three 
enterprise levels in the system. Broiler integrators, 
perhaps the most likely users of broiler futures, gener-
ally do not use them as an important part of their 
commercial business. Several integrators said they 
use them spasmodically, or are experimenting to de-
termine their potential use by the firm. 66 The futures 
market for feed ingredients is much more widely used 
by these firms than the iced broiler futures. 
Within a highly integrated system where owner-
ship and contract arrangements serve as coordinating 
and exchange devices, the number and role of spot 
transactions is significantly reduced. In the vertical 
brqiler system, spot transactions continue to charac-
66Changes in Dec. 1971 to make the iced broiler futures con· 
tracts deliverable are expected to improve the usefulness of these 
contracts by encouraging a closer relationship to the cash market. 
terize the sale of breeder chicks to integrators, the sale 
of ice pack broilers to retailers and eating establish-
ments, and the purchase by breeders and integrators 
of necessary inputs such as health supplies, equipment, 
and feed ingredients. The nature of these spot tran-
sactions varies from little (if any) price negotiation 
in the purchase of breeder chicks to considerable price 
checking and negotiating in the sale of broilers to re-
tail firms. In the latter case, an appreciable number 
of transactions do not carry a definite price, but rather 
are based on a specified day's price. (One might con-
sider these short-term formula prices, pertaining only 
to this week or next week.) This practice diminishes 
the base of the market price and poses additional prob-
lems to the Market News Service and other price re-
porting services. 
Institutions Affecting Demand, 
While government programs directly controlling 
prices or supplies have not applied to the broiler in-
dustry, various government activities do influence the 
effective total demand for broilers. Table 5 indicates 
the end use of broilers slaughtered during the fourth 
quarters of three consecutive years. Government 
programs and activities heavily influence the quantity 
of broilers going into export, military, and USDA 
channels. While the proportion of broilers going into 
these channels varies over time, 3.3% of the available 
broilers were diverted to these outlets in the fourth 
quarter of 1969. 
USDA purchases have been for the School Lunch 
Program, food for the needy, and for distribution to 
other countries under the Public Law 480 program. 
Total purchases in 1971 were 50 million lb.67 
Broiler exports increased to a peak of 1 72 million 
lb. in 1962, two-thirds of which went to Common 
Market countries. 68 A substantial increase in 'duties 
on U.S. broilers going into the Common Market was 
imposed in late 1962 and 1963, and increased further 
in 1965 ( 14 to 18 cents per pound on ready-to-cook 
broilers) . 69 The effect has been to seriously erode 
broiler exports to Common Market countries. Ex-
ports to these countries dropped from 113 ·million lb. 
in 1962 to 27 million lb. in 1965 to 1.5 million lb. in 
1970.70 Exports to all other countries gradually in-
creased from 60 million lb. in 1962 to 91 million lb. in 
1970 (aided by subsidies on broiler ~xports to Switzer-
land and Greece) . This increase has been far too 
gradual to offset the declines from Common Market 
countries; the net effect has been a ·drop of more than 
40% in broiler exports over an 8-year ·period. The 
78 million pounds lost represented 1 % of the broilers 
slaughtered in 1970. 
67PES 272, Poultry and Egg Situation, ERS, USDA, June 1972, 
p. 28. . 
68Selected Statistical Series for Poultry and Eggs Through 1965, 
ERS 232, ERS, USDA, Washington, D. C., May 1966, p. 22. 
69PES 244, Poultry and Egg Situation, ERS, USDA, Washington, 
D. C., Nov. 1966, p. 29. 
70Selected Statis1ical Series, op. cit., p. 22, and Poultry and Egg 
Situation, PES 261, April 1970, p. 40, and PES 269, Nov. 1971, p. 24. 
TABLE 5.-Broiler Slaught~r, Disappear,ance, and End Use During Fourth Quarters, 1967-1969. 
Percent Changet 
in 1969 
1967 1968 1969* from 1968 
Million Lb. Ready-to-Cook 
Slaughter:f: 1569 1626 1806 +11.0 
Disappearance-Total 1562 1624 1798 +10.7 
Exports 21 23 20 -11.7 
Military** 19 20 18 -10.0 
USDAtt 27 18 23 +28.8 
Domestic Sales 1494 1563 1737 + 11.l 
Indicated End Use: 
Further Processed 61 58 76 +30.6 
Cut-up 391 355 409 +15.2 
Whole Carcass 1110 1211 1313 + 8.4 
Pounds 
Per Capita Disappearance: 
Total 7.84 8.07 8.84 + 9.5 
Domestic Sales 7.64 7.90 8.67 + 9.7 
Cents per Pound 
9-City Wholesale Price:j::f: 23.20 25.53 27.45 + 7.5 
*Preliminary. 
tFrom unrounded data. 
:j:lncludes estimate of slaughter in non-federally inspected plants. 
**Based on month of purchase. The decline in 1969 results largely from relatively larger purchases of cut-up broilers without necks and 
giblets as compared to whole carcass birds. 
ttBased on contract month of shipment. 
:j::j:Simple averages of Monday prices. . 
Source: Broiler Marketing Guide, Third Quarter 1970. March 1970. PMG-11, Consumer and Marketing Service, USDA, Washington, D.C., p. 5. 
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While exports, USDA purchases, etc. represent 
a small proportion of total broiler sales, they can have 
an important incremental effect on price. Dr. Ralph 
Baker, poultry economist at The Ohio State Univer-
sity and Ohio Agricultural Research and Develop-
ment Center, estimates that while only 1.5 % of U. S. 
broiler production was exported in 1968, this increased 
domestic broiler prices by 0.5 cents per pound, an 
amount greater than the typical profit margins of 
broiler companies.71 
The exclusionary tactics of other countries are 
natural. Many have chosen to import breeder stock 
and technology and to erect tariffs to protect the de-
velopment of a domestic broiler industry, rather than 
import dressed broilers. As might be expected, U. S. 
broiler integrators are vitally interested in efforts to 
reduce foreign trade barriers. Their trade associa-
tions have encouraged such efforts by the U. S. gov-
ernment. On this point, many of the primary breed-
ing companies find themselves in conflict with integra-
tors. Since the foreign market for breeder chicks de-
pends on the rate of development of indigenous broiler 
industries, breeding companies generally favor those 
policies consistent with this. Some of these compa-
nies were instrumental in persuading the officials of 
the Common Market to raise their barriers in the early 
1960's. The increased tariffs have stimulated the 
domestic broiler industries in these countries and ex-
panded the market for breeder chicks, even though it 
has nearly eliminated EEC countries as markets for 
U. S. dressed broilers. 
In such matters, industry trade associations can 
play an important role in representing industry inter-
ests before government agencies. It is well to keep in 
mind, however, that trade associations are not line de-
cision points within the vertical system. Rather, they 
operate as catalysts, information sources, and imple-
menters of collective decisions. Where strong and ef-
fective leadership is present, trade associations are 
much more than responders to the desires of their 
members. They serve as important catalytic agents 
-stimulating their members to awareness on issues 
individual firm managers may not perceive because 
of limited perspectives. Still, their effectiveness ulti-
mately depends upon the support, cooperation, and 
collective action of their members. 
The more important trade associations servicing 
the broiler system are: 
National Broiler Council-represents primarily 
processors and integrators; activities include lobbying, 
the domestic promotion of broilers, educational pro-
grams for members and the retail trade, and occasional 
trade surveys. 
'l'j!Baker, Ralph. July 1969. Poultry Exports Worth $100 Million 
at Home. Broiler Industry, p. 25. 
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Poultry and Egg Institute of America-its recent 
merger with American Poultry and Hatchery Federa-
tion gives the Institute more balanced representation 
of all members of the vertical broiler complex as well 
as other poultry interests. Before the merger, the In-
stitute was integrator-poultry distributor in orientation, 
active in programs to stimulate quality control in the 
marketing of poultry products, heavily involved in lob-
bying, and conducted overseas promotion for U. S. 
broilers. The APHF, on the other hand, represented 
primarily breeders and hatchery operators in broilers 
and other poultry industries, was production oriented, 
and had not been very active in broilers except for lob-
bying efforts. 
Poultry and Egg National Board-essentially a 
promotional organization for poultry and egg products; 
financed by voluntary donations from a broad cross-
section of the various poultry industries; basically egg 
oriented since that industry is the major source of 
funds. 
Southeastern Poultry and Egg Association-re-
gional in representation, members include a cross sec-
tion of the vertical broiler system with emphasis on lo-
cal and regional independent processor-integrators; 
conducts extensive educational program covering many 
aspects of broiler business; also active in lobbying. 
National Broiler Marketing Association-organ-
ized as a cooperative in 1970 by a group of regional 
and independent broiler integrators, NBMA is not a 
trade association like the above organizations. Its 
thrust, however, is toward industry-wide cooperation 
in order to balance supply with demand for market 
stability. A key function of the cooperative has been 
communication with its members concerning market 
conditions and prices, and recommendations for vol-
untary adjustments in broiler production and market-
ing. The cooperative represented an estimated 50% 
of U. S. broiler production in 1971. However, ad-
visory statements by the Justice Department in 1971 
and 1972 have raised questions about the eligibility 
of integrators for membership in a Capper·-Volstead 
antitrust ·exempt cooperative. The future of NBMA 
is surrounded by uncertainty at the time of writing.72 
In addition to the above, three somewhat smaller 
regional associations operate to represent broiler com-
panies and other poultry interests in their areas. These 
are the Pacific Egg and Poultry Association, the 
Southwestern Egg and Poultry Association, and the 
Northeastern Poultry Producers Cooperative Organi-
zation (NEPPCO). 
The changing nature of the industry has brought 
the need for changes in the trade associations. The 
American Poultry and Hatchery Federation was in-
72For information on NBMA, see Broiler Industry, Nov. 1971 and 
Sept. 1972. 
itially an association of independent hatcherymen. 
The Poultry Institute, on the other hand, focused 
heavily on the needs of poultry processors and poultry 
distributors. With the demise of the independent 
hatcherymen in broilers and the absorption of this 
function by integrators, such a division of associations 
was unnecessary. In 1971, the two associations 
merged, becoming the Poultry and Egg Institute of 
America. The addition of the National Broiler Coun-
cil to this group has been proposed by some parties on 
the grounds that it would allow a more cohesive and 
consistent approach on public policy issues. 
Primary breeders tend to belong to most of the 
major trade associations. Since their customers are 
the dominant members of most of these associations, 
situations where a conflict of interest occurs are likely 
to be resolved in favor of the broiler integrators. The 
breeders have a separate association, Poultry Breeders 
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of America (an offshoot of APHF), which represents 
their interests. 
The above associations do not represent the in-
terests of broiler growers. Two of the major farm 
organizations, American Farm Bureau Federation and 
National Farmers Organization, have attempted with 
limited success to represent growers in recent years 
on public policy issues and in bargaining for more fa-
vorable contract terms. 
In addition to the institutions and arrangements 
so far discussed, a number of ancillary institutions 
provide essential services to the vertical broiler system. 
Corporate and cooperative suppliers of equipment and 
supplies, credit institutions, and university and gov-
ernment research programs all provide important ser-
vices and may affect the coordination and adjustment 
of the broiler system. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE DECISION ANATOMY 
OF THE BROILER SYSTEM 
The operation and evolution of the vertical broil-
er system does not automatically take place. It oc-
curs as a result of numerous decisions, both past and 
present, which are backed by the authority to carry 
them out and make them meaningful. The array of 
decisio:i;i points extending throughout the broiler com-
plex is like its nervous system.73 It is the network 
through which both coordination and adjustments 
take place. The network of decision points and asso-
ciated authority is ref erred to in this publication as the 
decision anatomy of the vertical system. 
The decision anatomy of the system provides an 
overall view of the control points and distribution of 
authority for the entire system at a point in time. 
73Unlike the nervous system of animals, which carries impulses 
from the brain to the various structural parts, the decision anatomy 
o·r a vertical system is a nervous system with several brains sending 
impulses up and down the system; i.e., there is no central control 
point. Much of the coordination is attained through voluntary con-
sensus, often arrived at through bargaining and free choices. 
Through time, as the distribution of authority shifts, 
the decision anatomy also changes.74 
The system level of aggregation poses problems 
of oversimplification, since decisions and authority 
are traced only to the firm or organizational level. 
Firms or agencies do not make decisions. Rather, de-
cisions are made by individuals and groups of individ-
uals as they perform certain roles within the firms and 
other organizations making up the system. There-
fore, it becomes useful to identify two additional types 
of decision formations which operate within, and are 
components of, the system's decision anatomy. These 
are the firm decision anatomy and the individual de-
cision structure. The firm decision anatomy refers to 
the network of decisions and associated distribution of 
74The distribution of authority in a vertical system does not 
necessarily define the points where decisions are made. Some de-
cisions rest on no clearly identified authority. Rather, they depend 
upon who wants to grab the ball. 































authority within individual firms. The individual de-
cision structure refers to the scope of authority of an 
individual and the number and type of decisions in 
wl?.ich he is involved. 
In all three decision formations (the decision 
anatomy of the system, the firm, and the individual 
decision structure), the focus of attention is on the 
structure of authority, the decision points (where de-
cisions are made), and the type of decisions involved 
(bilateral, unilateral, multi-firm, or institutionally 
imposed) . The main ·difference between the three 
is the level of aggregation where attention is focused. 
At all three levels, important factors influence 
decisions. These include the set of forces bearing on 
decision makers, such as the competitive environment, 
constraints on the alternatives which can be consid-
ered, the goals and values of individuals and organiza-
tions, and the economic-political-social environment. 
This set of forces is referred to as the decision environ-' 
ment for the system, firm, or individual. Thus, deci-
sion makers are viewed as key parts of a vertical sys-
tem, dependent upon the structure of authority within 
the system and within the firm, but strongly influenced 
in any particular decision by the decision environment 
~t that point in time. This concept is illustrated in 
Figure 10, along with the interactions occurring with-
in the system. -
The decision anatomy of the firm largely defines 
the decision structure of the individuals in the firm, 
which in turn influences the alternatives considered 
for a particular decision. The alternatives considered 
are also affected by the perception of individuals, 
and by the screening and modification of information 
on environmental forces as the information flows up 
or down the organization. As Figure 10 suggests, the 
individual decision maker seldom considers all of the 
available alternatives. 
A subset of the broiler decision anatomy may be 
the easiest way to illustrate the concept. Consider 
the management of a primary breeding company 
whose main concern is the sale of breeding chicks to 
broiler integrators for their hatchery supply flocks. 
The network of decisions affecting that action would 
be of particular interest to understand. 
Unfortunately, the decision anatomies of integra-
tors vary widely, making generalizations difficult. For 
illustrative purposes, a moderate-sized, specialized, 
broiler integrator is used. Such a firm may well 
FIG. 11.-Decision Structure for Selection of Breeder Chicks by Specialized Broiler Integrator. 
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operate with only one overall profit center, and with 
top management making the final decision on the 
breed, quantity, and timing of chicks purchased. 
These decisions are likely to depend, however, on in-
formation flowing to central management from the 
various operating departments. A simplified diagram 
of this decision process is in Figure 11. 
Understanding who makes the breeding chick 
decision in this firm would be of value. However, 
knowing the information on which the decision is 
bas·ed and the criteria used by the decision maker may 
be even more critical. These factors which make up 
the decision environment for this particular decision 
maker are critical for the fieldmen of the breeding 
firm to understand. They may well determine where 
he can most fruitfully work with the integrator to 
communicate the built-in capabilities and enhance the 
evaluation of his firm's chicks. The information upon 
which top management evaluates different breeds can 
also provide valuable feedback to the management of 
the breeding company, helping them identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of their product under field 
conditions. 75 
In this particular example, the decision concern-
ing the breed of chicks selected is unilaterally made by 
the top management of the integrator firm. As de-
picted, price is not an important part of the decision 
process, while past performance data from the broiler 
chick production division, grow-out division, and 
processing and marketing division are important in-
puts to the breeder chick replacement decision. The 
bilateral agreement (transaction) r·esulting from the 
breed selection decision involves negotiations primar-
ily on the quantity and timing of chicks to be deliv~ 
ered. 
The decision anatomy for an integrator with sev-
eral profit centers-organized either by function, by 
geographic region, or both-may be quite different. 
The regional manager or the manager in charge of 
broiler chick production may then make the decision 
on the breed of chick replacements. His authority 
may be constrained, however, by a list of breeds ap-
proved by firm headquarters. If the decision is made 
or strongly influenced by the manager of broiler chick 
production, the liveability, ease of management, rate 
of lay, and egg hatchability of breeding hens is likely 
to receive more emphasis than the performance of the 
broiler chicks in the grow-out farms; or the yield and 
desirability of the carcass from the processing opera-
75Comparing the results realized by integrators with their own 
field tests provides breeding companies with insights into the extent 
to which the potential performance of their birds is being realized. 
Henry Saglio of Arbor Acres said in the August 1968 issue of Broiler 
Industry, "We've put more potential into our birds ... than even 
most of our branches are getting out of them through management! 
.•. this is true ... among many of our customers." 
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tion. All factors should of course be considered if 
they affect the integrator and the ultimate market it 
serves. Where the decision on buying breeder stock 
is delegated to one division of a company, the needs of 
other divisions must be adequately recognized if the 
·overall performance of the firm is to be optimized. 
While this discussion has emphasized economic 
factors and rational decision processes, it is well to 
recognize the human dimensions involved in the deci-
sion anatomy. The goals and values of individual de-
cision makers, the personal relationships between buy-
er-seller representatives, and industry acceptance and 
recognition of certain types of actions and trade prac-
tices all enter into the decision process. Although 
they may be difficult to define, they are a part of the 
decision environment. . 
The foregoing has utilized the decision anatomy 
concept from the point of view of an individual firm 
with a specific purpose. As the reader can appreciate, 
similar applications of the concept could be made by 
other firms in the vertical system, by trade associa-
tion_s attempting to influence government programs, 
or by public agencies seeking to change certain aspects 
of the system's operation by educational means. In 
all cases, the relevant decision points and structure of 
authority, plus those factors influencing the decision, 
provide very critical and dynamic insights. 
Decision Anatomy of the Total System 
Expanding the decision anatomy concept to con-
sider the total vertical system entails some loss of de-
tail. The variety of decision anatomies within indi-
vidual firms for different types of decisions are suffi-
ciently complicated to tax one's ability to comprehend 
when looking only at a part of the system. Attempt-
ing to consider them for the overall vertical system 
would seem to be an exercise in futility and frustration. 
For this reason, in defining the system's decision 
anatomy, the firm's decision anatomy is ignored. The 
approach focuses instead on the locations and charac-
teristics of bilateral decisions (transactions), multi-
firm decisions (through trade associations, for ex-:-
ample), and institutionally imposed decisions (e.g., 
government regulations) . The remaining decisions 
necessary for the system to function and adapt are at-
tributed to unilateral decisions (or intra-firm nego-
tiated decisions) made within firms at different stages 
of the system, without attempting to fathom the inner 
workings of the firms involved. 
Figure 12 presents another scheme of the. vertical 
broiler system, showing the ownership of facilities at 
different stages, and the movement and methods of ex-
change of the product. This provides a skeleton on 
which a more comprehensive view of the overall deci-
sion anatomy can be developed. While it falls far 
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short of presenting the complete picture, it provides 
a general overview of the structure of authority based 
on ownership of facilities and the product. 
To flesh this out, information is needed concern-
ing bilateral, multi-firm, and institutionally imposed 
decisions. 
Bilateral decisions refer to market transactions 
which are single decisions subscribed to by two inde-
pendent parties, each of whom has authority to carry 
out the agreement. These link the proprietary en-
tities in the vertical system through the exchange of 
product, and are the means ·by which many resource 
inputs are obtained for integration into the indus-
trialization process. Product exchange tends to oc-
cur via spot transactions. The nature of these trans-
actions differs greatly, however, from the consumer 
purchase at the supermarket to the purchase of chicks 
by broiler integrators. In the latter case where on-
going relationships between relatively few firms stimu-
late awareness of their mutuality of interests, a close 
working relationship tends to emerge. In this envi-
ronment, mutual compromises often occur. For ex-
ample, when an integrator makes a decision to reduce 
his tentative advance order for replacement chicks, 
he may moderate the impact of this reduction on 
breeding companies by cutting his breeding flock a 
month earlier than intended. Conversely, during a 
period of expansion when replacement chicks may be 
in short supply, the primary breeder is likely to give 
priority to those integrators who have attempted to 
help him during periods of retraction. Because of 
their long-term working relationships, the primary 
breeder will seldom take advantage of favorable mar-
ket conditions by raising the price of his chicks. 
Somewhat similar relationships affect the spot 
transactions linking breeders or integrators with the 
suppliers of their primary inputs (equipment, health 
products, feed or feed ingredients, etc.) . The impor-
tanoe of long run, mutually beneficial relationships 
tends to temper individual bilateral decisions. 
The relationship between integrators and distri·-
bution firms tends to be more distant, although long-
term working relationships also develop at this stage, 
particularly where chill pack or branded broilers are 
involved. For the most part, however, the buyers for 
large retail or restaurant chains are strongly concerned 
about having alternative suppliers to protect their 
bargaining position. A definite aversion to becoming 
dependent on a single supplier is apparent. This 
philosophy is not conducive to close long-term work-
ing, relations. 
Integrator-distributor bilateral decisions repre-
sent one of the most powerful decision points in the 
system. These decisions have had a major influence 
on the type and form of broilers marketed (fresh, deep 
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chill or. frozen, packaged or unpackaged, distributor 
brand or processor brand, etc.) and on the heavy em-
phasis on price in the system. The obsession of many 
retailers with price merchandising and gross profit as 
a measure of profitability, plus their aversion to be-
coming dependent on single suppliers, have been defi-
nite impediments to the acceptance of deep chill broil-
ers. 
The contractual arrangements characterizing 
some of the bilateral decisions might suggest working 
relations which are more long range than spot tran-
sactions. However, this varies widely. For example, 
forward sale contracts with government agencies or 
with foreign governments tend to be isolated or sepa-
rate transactions, with sealed bids submitted for cer-
tain product spedfications. 
However, contracts with hatchery supply flock 
operators for the employment of their facilities and 
labor occur largely under a long-term continuous rela-
tionship. The same is true to a somewhat lesser ex-
tent of the contracts with broiler growers. The num-
ber of hatchery supply flock operators is considerably 
less than the number of contract growers. Sound 
management 9f individual flocks is, therefore, more 
critical in the former than the latter. Not surprising-
ly, the turnover rate of growers contracting with a 
particular integrator is normally higher than for 
hatchery supply flock operators under contract. 
Contracts are also used as vehicles to stimulate 
technological change. Although integrators may not 
own the facilities and equipment for the grow-out or 
supply flock operations, they may effectively control 
them by stipulating certain environmental conditions 
as requisites for contracting. The use of contracts 
in this way has accelerated the rate of technological 
change at the producer level. At the same tjme, it 
has created hardships by tending to keep some produ-
cers in perpetual debt. Where the financing of new 
equipment and facilities is arranged by the integrator, 
an added measure of control by the integrator is pro-
vided. This does not necessarily mean such control 
is used for exploitive purpos·e; however, it does affect 
the freedom of producers entering into contractual 
agreements. 
The foregoing provides some elaboration con-
cerning the characteristics of bilateral decisions within 
the broiler system. In attempting to generalize about 
these ·decisions, the most typical relationships have 
been presented. It is recognized that there are many 
departu:r:es from the relationships presented. 
Multi-firm and institutionally imposed decisions 
are those occurring due to the collective agreement of 
many firms in an industry, normally through their 
trade associations. In fact, industry associations exist 
as a result of such decisions. Except in directing the 
activities and concerns of their trade associat10ns, 
multifirm decisions generally lack (in fact,. are legally 
prevented from exercising) the authority needed for 
implementation of some actions, especially those re-
lating to price. The expression of multi-firm de-
cisions is generally through the educational, promo-
tional, and service .programs, and the lobbying activi-
t~es of their trade associations. 
Institutionally imposed decisions are. those de-
cisions resting on outside or sovereign authority for 
implementation. They include the host of decisions 
made by various governmental agencies which the in-
dustry or system is obliged to accept, once they have 
been made. In large part, such decisions are collec-
tive (not unilateral in their origin), since the interests 
of the various parties involved are considered. Insti-
tutionally imposed decisions often represent a compro-
mise or blending of multi-firm decisions and the de-
sires of other groups. There is frequently a close rela-
tionship (although not necessarily a high correlation) 
between multi-firm and institutionally imposed de-
cisions. 
The various governmental regulations affecting 
the broiler system are the result of past institutional 
decisions. Some of these provide rather direct con-
straints on industry conduct (regulations on inspection 
of processing plants, packaging, labeling, unfair com-
petitive practices, etc.) . Others, such as anti-trust 
regulations, provide constraints on both the structure 
and conduct of the industries in the broiler system. 
Still others influence the system largely through their 
economic impact (e.g., freight rates, tax regulations, 
export/import tariffs and restrictions, etc.) . 
In addition to the above set of institutionally im-
posed decisions, the system's decision anatomy also re-
flects decisions based upon industry preference, but 
which only public institutions have the authority to 
implement. The nature and coverage of USDA Mar-
ket News on broilers, the development of a futures 
market on ice packed broilers, and the availability of 
a federal grading service on broilers all represent this 
type of situation. However, these programs are used 
on an optional basis by system members. 
Finally, the many unwritten customs, rules, and 
trade practices operating in most vertical systems to 
define what is ethically and socially desirable are also 
included as institutional decisions. While these are 
often difficult to define, they often function to en-
courage cooperation within the system and the fair 
treatment of system members. 
The purpose of this discussion is not simply to 
review the various institutions and arrangements af-
fecting the vertical broiler system. It is to stress the 
idea that these, too, result from decisions of various 
types and lend themselves to the decision-anatomy 
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concept.·· The decision points, the structure of au-
thority and influence, and the objectives of the organi-
zations involved help in understanding the various 
regulating and coordinating institutions and arrange-
ments from a dynamic rather than static perspective. 
Unilateral decisions-:--Bilateral, multi-firm,· and 
institutionally imposed decisions play an essential part 
in the coordination and adjustment of the vertical 
broiler complex. . They provide a type of check and 
balance within the system, influence the environment 
within which it operates, and have a significant im-
pact on the distribution of income to the various or-
ganizations and resources involved. Yet, important 
as these are, the bulk of the activities in the system re-
sult from unilateral decisions made within firms. 
The various types of decisions are not separate 
and distinct, however, but are rather highly interre-
lated and interdependent. Unilateral decisions on 
the size and quality of broilers produced are reflec-
tions of information received from bilateral transac-
tions with customers.. Still, the authority to decide 
the quality and size of broilers rests with the integra-
tor. Since it is a unilateral decision, th,~ pro~ess of 
reaching a decision and implementing it is likely to 
be quicker and easier. But the chance of the deci-
sion being inconsistent with the welfare of the system 
may be greater than where two compensating inter-
ests are bilaterally balanced. 
In trying to understand the overall decision 
anatomy for the broiler system, it is a useful simplifi-
cation to differentiate the various unilateral decisions 
only by the proprietary entity where they are made. 
The broiler integrator generally decides the feed ra-
tion and medication program for his broilers. Con-
tract growers have little if any responsibility for these 
decisions. Going beyond this point to examine the 
hierarchy of authority within the integrator firm, 
which determines who makes the feed and medication 
decisions, would bring a degree of complexity un-
warranted for the present purpose. 
This simplification of reality carries inherent 
dangers. It makes it too easy to assume that the 
various unilateral decisions made within a firm are 
coordinated and consistent; that they reflect the ob-
jectives and policies of t~e firm. This is not true. In 
fact, it represents one of the serious limitations of large, 
diversified companies. The organization of some 
broiler integrators, for example, results in decisions 
and actions not too dissimilar from those expected if 
the various divisions were separate firms (i.e., a non-
integrated system). This situation (which one inde-
pendent called intra-company intercourse) appears 
to be declining as a problem in the industry since 
profit centers have been broadened and more central 
coordination encouraged. -
These comments about the overall system's de-
cision anatomy build upon the earlier discussion of 
system functions, proprietary .and authority struc-
ture, and institutions and arrangements. It is well to 
keep in mind that a system is an industrialization 
process in which the various inputs and functions are 
integrated to achieve some end objective. The deci-
sion points in a system tend to parallel the array of 
functions performed in this vertical integration proc-
ess. The authority and constraints associated with 
particular decision points determine the extent to 
which a decision point controls a particular function. 
Bilateral or multi-firm decisions where the authority 
is shared among :i;nore than one entity involve less 
control than decisions where the authority is solely 
within one entity, either due to sovereign power, prop-
erty rights, or legal agreement. Understanding the 
configuration and dynamics of decisions and author-
ity in a vertical complex provides valuable insights in-
to the points of leverage and control in a system. 
CHAPTER V 
FORCES AND INSTRUMENTS OF CHANGE 
The evolving, rapidly changing nature of the 
vertical broiler system represents the response and ad-
justment of the system to several interacting change 
forces. Seven categories of change forces generating 
much of the change in the broiler complex have been 
defined. In studying the system's evolution, the dom-
ino effect of change is very evident; the changes re-
sulting from certain forces created new imbalances 
and opportunities, which in turn became forces for 
additional change. Where one starts in this chain 
of change is somewhat arbitrary. The forces identi-
fied are: 
• New technology 
• Rapid growth in the volume of broilers produced 
and consumed 
$ Unstable supply and price conditions 
• Changes in the goals of firms, and in the methods 
of achieving these goals 
• Conflict between the vertical members of the 
system concerning distribution of returns, control 
over decisions, and the performance of functions 
• Protection of national, regional, or vocational 
interests 
• Competitive rivalry; the quest for a differential 
advantage. 
Change results when a decision is made which 
transforms into action those forces pressing for or in-
viting change. Both the force and the decision are 
essential requisites for change to occur. Within the 
vertical broiler complex, change forces have been acti-
vated through all types of dec~sions; unilateral, bi-
lateral, multi-firm or industry, institutionally imposed 
(rules and regulations), and institutional in collabo-
ration with the industry (public services and institu-
tions) . The type of decision involved, has depended 
upon the perceived type of change needed, the struc-
ture of authority to make the decision required, and 
how and by whom the pressures for change were in-
terpreted. 
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With some exceptions, the broiler complex ap-
pears to have been alert and responsive to pressures 
and imbalances developing within or outside the broil-
er system. This certainly is in part responsible for 
the relatively low level of regulation affecting the sys-
tem. 
The force of competitive rivalry has been so 
omnipresent in the post-World War II history of the 
broiler system that no attempt will be made to com-
ment on its role separately. Because of the relatively 
unregulated nature of the industry, competitive forces 
have been allowed to operate rather freely. This dy-
namic force is interwoven with the other six forces. 
New Technology 
Advances in broiler breeding, feeding, disease 
and health control, housing, processing, shipping, and 
management procedures have provided fundamental 
forces to transform the broiler complex from an as-
semblage of atomistic, loosely organized, and small 
volume industries to the present highly industrialized 
vertical system. These advances are reflected in a 
decline in the feed required to produce a pound of 
broilers from 3.6 lb. in 1950 to 2.5 lb. in 1963 to an 
estimated 2.2 lb. in 1969.76 The time required to 
grow a 3.5 lb. broiler was reduced during this 20-year 
period from 10-12 weeks to about 8~ weeks.77 Tests 
of caged broilers reveal that the time requirement 
may be reduced to 6~ weeks through this innovation 
in housing.78 Most of these changes were cost reduc-
ing or quality improving in nature, or both. 
The sources of the many technological changes 
which have significantly reduced the cost of deliver-
ing broilers to the retail meat counter have received 
76Source of 1950 and r963 figures was USDA, Poultry and Egg 
Situation, Nov. 1963, p. 13; 1969 figure is based on industry esti-
mates. 
77PES 261, Poultry and Egg Situation, ERS, USDA, April 1970, 
p. 11. 
78Haffert, William. Nov. 7, 1969. A Dazzling Decade of Change. 
Mimeo of speech at AMA Agribusiness Seminar, St. Louis, Mo. 
comment in several studies on the broiler industry. 
Some originated from university or government re-
search efforts (particularly since the late l 950's) ; 
others from research and experimentation by com-
mercial firms which were a part of, or supplied inputs 
to, the broiler system. In part, they were due to a 
national commitment to research in agriculture, and 
in part a result of a competitive private enterprise 
system. 
The implementation of the newly developed tech-
nology was yet another matter, since it called for 
many unilateral investment decisions and changes in 
management practices. 
"Given the explosive forces of technology in the 
poultry industries in the period since World War II, 
it was inevitable that the enterprise system would find 
ways to implement them rapidly. There was no im-
portant barrier to block rapid adoption of the new 
technologies ... It is reasonably clear that the physical 
production efficiencies actually achieved would not 
have come as rapidly if it would have been required 
that traditional agriculture-independently organized 
into autonomous decision-making units-should have 
prevailed. m 9 
The net effect of technological advances was to 
place broilers in a very favorable competitive position 
relative to other meats for the patronage of American 
and foreign consumers-broiler.s that were meatier 
and more desirable than their ancestors. Stimulated 
by promotions in supermarkets, consumer purchases 
grew rapidly, creating another pressure for change as 
the system attempted to reorganize to meet the rapidly 
growing market. 
Rapid Growth 
At the end of World War II (1945), the U.S. 
broiler industry produced 366 million broilers annual-
ly. Approximately 25 years later, the volume pro-
duced had mushroomed eight-fold to 3.0 billion birds. 
Such a growth rate is not accomplished easily or pain·· 
lessly. It required a major reorganization of the ver-
tical system. 
Experience with birds bred with improved meat 
characteristics during World War II and in the years 
following convinced many of the need for and profit 
opportunity from developing a meat-type commercial 
broiler. As genetic research developed a more desir-
able bird, and a combination of technological changes 
reduced the cost of production, the potential growth 
of the industry attracted more participants. As new 
and often inexperienced growers entered production, 
and as existing growers expanded production to meet 
market demand and avail themselves of scale econo-
79National Commission on Food Marketing, Tech. Study 2, op. cit., 
p. 10. 
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mies, the need for credit increased greatly. A num-
ber of capital sources were instrumental during the 
rapid growth of the 1950's; feed manufacturers and 
dealers, who were anxious to gain and maintain a share 
of this growth industry, extended considerable 
amounts on open account; commercial banks and 
agricultural credit ins~itutions were other sources. In 
some cases, lenders were too liberal in providing fi-
nancing, allowing undercapitalized, marginal growers 
to enter the business, only to be promptly washed out 
with the first serious price depression. 
The scramble to get aboard wa8 not in perfect 
balance with the growth in demand, resulting in fluc-
tuating prices which increased the risks of those in-
volved. Many growers found themselves in a highly 
vulnerable position with an undercapitalized operation, 
a continual need to expand and re-equip their opera-
tion (which would weaken their financial position 
further), and an unstable market price. They re-
acted by seeking others in the vertical complex willing 
to share the risks involved and provide financing as-
sistance. Feed manufacturers and meat packers were 
logical candidates for some type of joint venture with 
producers. Both had very strong interests in the 
growth and development of the broiler industry. 
Unstable Supply and Price Conditions 
Because the actions of system members have not 
been constrained or modified by government price or 
supply controls, the collective impact of many inde-
pendent decision. makers has been fully reflected in 
market prices. The periods of price depression since 
1956 are shown in Figure 1; 1959, 1961, 1967, and 
1970-72 stand out in particular. 
The changes stimulated by the pains of instability 
included very fundamental adjustments in the or-
ganization of the system (concentration and vertical 
integration}, changes in the institutions and informa-
tion networks serving the system, and a re-examina-
tion by firms of their goals and methods of achieving 
such goals. Some examples may help bring the na-
ture of these changes to life. 
Vertical Integration 
Swift and Co.-As a large meat packer, Swift 
and Co. has been processing and distributing poultry 
for more than 60 years. In the l 930's it added some 
hatcheries to supply broiler chicks to growers, and also 
entered into agreements to purchase various growers' 
birds at the market price. By the mid-1950's, rapid 
technological change and industry instabilities spur-
red growers to ask Swift to share the market risks. 
Concerned with maintaining a reliable supply of broil-
ers, the company entered into grower contracts with 
formula prices tied to a prevailing market price. These 
contracts had floor prices, below which losses were 
shared by the three parties to the contract-the grow-
er, Swift, and a feed manufacturer. 
Following the drastic price recessions of 1959 
and 1961, many growers sought to avoid the risks of 
a mercurial market altogether. So, in 1959 Swift 
began retaining ownership of the birds throughout 
and employing growers and their facilities by con-
tract. This practice gradually expanded until it was 
the norm for the company by the mid-1960's. In 
1962, Swift tied in its feed manufacturing operations 
by developing plants in broiler production areas to 
realize available cost economies. 
From the standpoint of company objectives, these 
moves can be interpreted as largely defensive in na-
ture. Throughout, the primary concern was to pro-
tect their supply sources in order to be able to serve 
their customers. Company officials indicate that the 
moves toward further integration were made grud-
gingly; inch by inch they were drawn into the indus-
try. Once started, the forces seemed irreversible. 
Swift reduced their growing operations in recent 
years; in 1971, the company was estimated to be the 
fifth largest processor of broilers in the U. S.80 
Tyson Foods-From a trucker of live broilers in 
the 1930's, the Tyson family business gradually mush-
roomed into the nation's largest specialized broiler 
company. In 1968, the company was the fourteenth 
largest processor of broilers in the U. S.81 By 1972, 
Tyson was estimated to be the third largest broiler 
processor. 
In this case, the gradual expansion and diversifi-
cation of the family enterprise seems to have stemmed 
.. largely from taking advantage of growth opportuni-
ties. Having become involved in the live trucking of 
chickens in the l 930's, the elder Tyson found that 
farmers were having difficulty obtaining chiCks. 
Sensing a profit opportunity, he bought a hatchery 
and began selling baby chicks to the same farmers 
whose grown birds he transported to market. Hav-
ing sold chicks to.a farmer, he also knew wh~n to con-
tact him to truck his grown birds, thus assuming a co·-
ordinating role for the farmers he served. 
During World War II, growers were having diffi-
culty obtaining feed; the Tyson family entered the 
feed business in order to fill this need and opportunity. 
When mandatory federal inspection of poultry 
processing plants in 1959 forced many small plants 
to close and provided a natural climate for interested 
new entrants, the Tysons opened their first processing 
plant. This provided even greater opportunities to 
increase the sales of chicks and feed. Shortly follow-
80Letter from W. V. Smith, Swift Dairy and Poultry Co., Oct. 4, 
1971. 
81Henry, William, August 1969. 1969 Ranking of U. S. Broiler 
Plant Leaders. Broiler Industry. 
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ing this, they found it necessary to maintain owner-
ship of the birds and to contract with growers for the 
grow-out function. Step by step, the company moved 
from one opportunity to another-to the positio~ 
of a fully integrated broiler operation. 
During the 1960's, the company orientation shift-
ed from a strong focus on production to a deep com-
mitment to marketing. The impact of iced broiler 
price fluctuations has been cushioned through mar-
keting chill pack and cooked broilers, and by devel-
oping forward contracts with further manufacturers. 
Recently, the company has successfully test marketed 
the Tyson brand of chill pack broilers in. the Denver 
market-providing yet another avenue to avoid the 
fickle fate of commodity prices~ 
In addition, the company has diversified by de-
veloping a completely integrated egg operation, has 
process·ed. and sold Cornish hens and ducks for some 
time, and in 1972 was in its sixth year of hog produc-
tion. 
Ralston Purina-As a major feed manufacturer, 
and with feed representing about 70% of the cost of 
growing broilers, a common interest. between Purina 
and broiler growers was natural. During the 1950's, 
expanding growers relied for their feed upon the trade 
credit provided by the company o:n open accqunt. 
New. mills were constructed in producing areas in 
order to compete in price and service. 
In the late 1950's, when growers indicated they 
were unable or unwilling to accept the market risks, 
the company became involved in contracts guarantee-
ing a minimum return to growers (initially in con-
junction with their feed dealers and later in. conjunc-
tion with processors) . 
With the financial crisis of 1961, Purina found 
the future of many of its mills (as well as-independent 
mills it was supplying with feed) in jeopa~dy as many 
small and medium-siz·ed proces.sor-integrators were on 
the brink of bankruptcy. The series of mergers Pur-
ina consummated at that time placed it firmly in the 
integrated broiler business with hatchery supply 
flocks, hatcheries, and processing plants. In large 
part, the acquisitions were to defend sizeable chow sales 
in an area. 82 Like Swift, Purina felt gradually drawn 
into the industry by its efforts to protect its basic busi-
ness. 
By 1968, Purina was estimated to be the largest 
processor of broile.rs in the U. S. In i971, the com-
pany announced plans to launch a full line of branded 
poultry products, including several ·pre-cooked frozen 
broiler products, chill pack broilers, and eggs, as well 
as frozen turkeys, ducks, Cornish hens, etc. All prod-
82This was not true of all acquisitions, however. A broiler com-
pany in Maine was acquired primarily to provide Purina with man-
agement personnel experienced in the broiler business. 
ucts were to be marketed under Purina's brand, backed 
by heavy promotions. Unfortunately, the plans 
for this effort took shape during a period of seriously 
depressed broiler and egg prices. In the fall of 1971, 
Purina decided to divest of their broiler and egg op-
erations-a decision causing shock waves throughout 
the broiler system. The mercurial prices and earn-
ings in the broiler business had proven too inconsistent 
with the image Purina was trying to project to the 
investment community-that of a diversified food and 
farm supply company. When it left the industry, 
Purina was the third or fourth largest broiler proces-
sor. 
The impact of Purina's exit can only be esti-
mated. Since nearly all of their facilities were sold 
to other operators, little change in production and 
processing capacity occurred. Some industry person-
~el felt that independent regional integrators, in par-
ticular, would miss the stabilizing influence and the 
price umbrella provided by Purina. 
Purina's move does raise questions concerning 
the future of diversified nationals in the broiler sys-
tem. Regional integrators have demonstrated great-
er growth, aggressiveness, and willingness to ride out 
price depressions than the diversified nationals during 
the past decade. It may be that only those nationals 
with a strong commodity orientation will choose to 
continue contracting and processing broilers if serious 
price instability continues. 
Holly Farms-Unlike the previous examples, in 
which the firms moved a step at a time in integrating 
the various stages of the broiler system, Holly Farms 
became a folly integrated broiler company through 
one multi-firm decision. In Dec. 1961, 16 privately 
owned corporations were consolidated into one pri-
vately owned holding company, Holly Farms Poultry 
Industries. Among the 16 companies were three 
hatcheries, a feed mill with grain purchasing and 
hauling subsidiaries, five broiler contractors, one 
breeder-flock company, a poultry processing plant, 
and three related companies. In consolidating five 
previously independent stages of the broiler system 
within one company, four market linkages were re-
placed by intracompany transfers, and the objectives 
at each stage were modified to be consistent with the 
best interests of the total company. 
The forces causing the creation of Holly Farms 
are described as purely·economic.83 Most of the com-
panies involved had been doing business with each 
other prior to the merger and were successful on their 
own. Their combined long run appraisal of the 
83The information on Holly Farms is largely based upon the au-
thors' correspondence with Arthur Upshaw, vice president of the Fed-
eral Company, which acquired Holly Farms in 1968. Mr. Upshaw 
was an officer of one of the 1.6 companies merged to create Holly 
Farms in 1961. ' 
41 
broiler industry suggested that they must either inte-
grate individually,· and compete with each other, or 
join forces by consolidating into one company. 
The performance of the consolidated company 
has demonstrated the strength of tight coordination 
over a substantial part of the vertical broiler system 
under alert management. From 1962 to 1970, Holly's 
dollar sales of poultry more than quadrupled. An 
important part of this sales growth was due to the 
successful introduction of Holly-Pak poultry in 1964. 84 
Although other poultry processors had previously at-
tempted to prepackage broilers at the processing plant, 
Holly was the first to successfully do so on a commer-
cial scale. To win its million dollar gamble~ Holly 
found it necessary not only to control quality closely at 
all levels (including delivery to retail stores by Holly 
trucks), but also to place heavy emphasis on under-
standing and working closely with retailers. The total 
marketing program which emerged was probably more 
extensive and more strongly retailer oriented than orig-
inally envisioned. However, because of this, it has 
provided Holly with a distinct competitive advantage. 
Holly-Pak represented more than 80% of Holly 
Farms' volume in 1969. 
While Holly-Pak has provided strong enterprise 
differentiation for Holly as a supplier, the fact that 
retailer labels have generally been used has prevented 
their development of a consumer recognized brand of 
fryers. With such a significant breakthrough in 
marketing broilers, it would seem logical that Holly 
might have seized this opportunity to develop their 
own brand of fryers. Many in the industry wonder 
why they did not. In large part, the explanation 
seems to lie in Holly's relationship with retail firms. 
The successful introduction of Holly-Pak depended 
upon retailer acceptance of Holly-Pak and of Holly 
Farms as their sole (or at least major) supplier of 
fresh fryers. Retailers ·are generally reluctant to be-
come dependent upon a single supplier of a product 
as important as broilers, particularly a product which 
carries the processor's brand. If they had insisted on 
packing only under their own label, Holly Farms man-
agement might well have found that many food chains 
would accept Holly as one of their suppliers, but not 
the sole or even primary source of fryers. By offering 
to package with store labels, the chance of becoming 
the major supplier of chains was greater. 
. The development of chill pack broilers by other 
integrators in recent years has eroded some of Holly 
Farms competitive advantage and yet has also re-
moved retailer anxiety in accepting an innovation 
available from only one supplier. More retail firms 
84Broilers prepackaged at the processor level and distributed in 
fresh form are referred to as chill pack or deep chilled broilers by the 
industry. Holly-Pak .is Holly Farms' identification for this marketing 
method. 
are willing to accept the chill pack form of broilers 
with alternative sources of supply. These changes 
may also have had some influence on the willingness 
of retailers to accept processor brands of chill pack 
broilers. At the time of writing, Tyson and Purnell 
have successfully penetrated the Denver and Memphis 
markets with processor branded chill packs; Holly has 
announced plans to test its brand in the Chicago mar-
ket. 
Like many other broiler companies, Holly has 
actively sought ways to diversify in recent years. A 
joint venture with Safeway Stores, initiated in 1969, 
led Holly into the fried chicken carry-out business. 
By 1972, these outlets were realizing good results. A 
substantial increase in the number of these outlets is 
planned. A dog food made from chicken is now being 
marketed by Holly, and several convenience f9ods 
made from chicken are under development. In addi-
tion, the company has done some exploration into the 
hog and catfish industries, utilizing the same organi-
zation and coordination concepts effective in broilers. 
In 1972, Holly Farms was estimated to be the 
largest processor of broilers in the United States. 
Concentration 
The ebb and flow of the fortunes of broiler firms 
has resulted in many marginal and poorly financed 
firms being forced out of the system. The forces of 
new technology and rapid growth have provided ad-
vantages to well-financed firms, which could imple-
ment new technology and expand capacity without 
serious financial constraints. The periodic price de-
pressions in the industry have severely tested the finan-
cial structure of participants-again favoring some-
what larger firms (and their associated growers and 
suppliers) with a strong capital base and good access 
to the capital markets. 
In addition to the need for a sound financial base, 
the characteristics of the system also place a premium 
on efficient production and intra-firm coordination. 
Although in recent years marketing has received more 
attention, it is a critical success factor for only a few 
integrators. 
The net effect of these factors has been a reduc-
tion in the number of integrators and primary breed-
ers; i.e., increased concentration in both industries. 
While the requisite characteristics of successful firms 
would seem to favor the large, diversified, national 
firms, the well-managed specialized, regional integra-
tors have been more than able to hold their own to 
date. If marketing expertise becomes more impor-
tant (the development and mark.eting of new branded 
broiler products, for example), the large national inte-
grators may be able to realize some comparative 
advantage. 
42 
Changes in Institutions and Arrangements 
The combined effect of technological advances, 
rapid growth, and price instabilities produced several 
changes in the institutions and arrangements affecting 
the vertical broiler complex. One of the natural re-
actions of an industry buffeted by price instability is 
to seek information allowing more accurate planning 
and coordination. The broiler industry has encour-
aged the USDA to modify existing reports and to 
create new reports providing greater insights into inter-
mediate and long-run supply, demand, and price con-
ditions. The Breeder Placement Report and the 
Chick and Egg Placement Report are of this type. In 
recent years, the industry asked the USDA to develop 
recommendations for adjustments in the quantities of 
broilers at various stages in the pipeline. The widely 
used quarterly Broiler Marketing Guide is the result. 
As· the broiler complex became more integrated, 
the price reporting system suffered from thinness of 
trading in intermediate items. The volume of hatch-
ing eggs, broiler chicks, and live broilers involved in 
market transactions gradually dwindled. As ~ re-
sult, the base for market reports on these items be-
came unstable, and the validity of price reports was 
questioned. In 1965, USDA changed its market 
news reporting from live broiler quotations to ready-
to-eat broiler prices-as reflected by processor sales 
information and distributor procurement data. 
The industry has expressed the need for addi-
tional information for the price-discovering process. 
On the grounds that the prices of consummated 
wholesale transactions may be unrepresentative be-
cause of the thin volume traded, particularly during 
the first two days of the week, the industry encouraged 
the USDA in 1970 to attempt reporting bid and offer 
price data in addition to existing price reports. At 
the time of writing, this has not been attempted. 
The development of,futures markets for broilers, 
first for frozen broilers in 1962 and then fo_!:,ice-packed 
broilers in 1968, represents another effort by the in-
dustry to develop procedures which would broaden 
the market, and incidentally provide one measure of 
the level at which buyers and sellers are willing to put 
their price expectations on the line. Thus, a vehicle is 
made available for transferring to others the impact of 
price fluctuations. 85 However, from the limited num-
ber of firms interviewed, it appears neither integrators 
nor distributors as yet use the broiler futures market 
as an important part of their commercial business. 
In spite of this, trading has grown sufficiently on the 
iced broiler futures to make it a well-established mar-
ket. This market is still largely untested as a hedg-
85See Arthur, Henry B. 1971. Commodity Futures as a Business 
Management Tool. Harvard University, Boston. 
ing medium. The changes made in Dec. 1971 to 
make the contracts deliverable should result in a clo-
ser relationship to the cash market and make the con-
tracts more useful for hedging purposes. 
The National Broiler Marketing Association or-
ganized in 1970 represents yet another institution 
created to help deal with price instability. Its history 
is too brief and its future too uncertain to allow evalu-
ation. 
Changes in Firm Goals and 
Methods of Achieving Goals 
Periodic price depressions and the progressive in-
crease in the size of broiler firms have stimulated a re-
examination by many firms of their goals in the broil-
er business and the most appropriate methods of 
achieving such goals. The presence of publicly held 
firms with professional management has resulted in 
greater concern for return on investment as a primary 
criterion. 
One characterization of the shift in integrator 
goals is: 
1950's-How many chickens are you growing? 
Early l 960's-How many chickens are you kill-
ing? 
Late 1960's-What's your return on investment? 
One might expect that the presence of more large 
firms whose stockholders are interested in both the 
growth and stability of earnings would be a tempering 
and moderating influence. From 1961 to 1967, 
greater stability was apparent. However, the de-
pressed prices in 1967 and 1970-72 suggest that the 
system is still subject to the periodic price depressions 
which have been one of its most troublesome charac-
teristics. 
Distress conditions have also stimulated examina-
tion of the organizational problems within individual 
firms. Many integrators were initially organized 
with several profit centers within their broiler opera-
tion (e.g., the hatchery supply flocks, hatcheries, 
grow-out division, processing plants, marketing de-
partment, and feed mills may all have been profit cen-
ters). This posed internal problems of transfer pric-
ing, financing, the distribution of risk, allocation of 
overhead expenses, etc. For example, a firm basing 
its transfer prices on the costs at each stage of pro: 
duction could easily place its processing or marketing 
division in a situation ·where it absorbed all risks of 
price fluctuations. This procedure has proved disas-
trous to the careers of some of the men heading these 
divisions, and created undesired friction within firms. 
It would seem reasonable, however, to make each op-
eration a cost center) not owning the birds, but taking 
as its target a standard cost formula adjustable for the 
different operating scales and types of operations. 
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In any event, integrators have generally moved 
toward a single profit center covering all broiler op-
erations. However, the pattern still differs widely 
from firm to firm. Establishing transfer prices based 
upon a market price has become increasingly difficult; 
further, pricing at intermediate stages serves very 
little purpose within an integrated firm. Hence, it 
seems likely that firms will continue to move toward 
a single commodity profit center for the entire inte-
grated operation, and use other criteria such as cost 
and performance standards to evaluate the effective-
ness of individual departments and divisions. 
The mercurial market price for broilers has effec-
tively convinced many processor-integrators of the 
vulnerability involved in marketing undifferentiated 
commodities. It is only natural that these firms have 
taken action to reduce their dependence on the mar-
ket for ice packed broilers. The development of chill 
pack broilers is a step toward enterprise differentia-
tion, even though it has normally not been used to 
establish a brand preference with consumers. Cooked 
broilers, boneless products, and branded fresh broilers 
represent other attempts to move away from a cord-
wood market~ 
Another avenue of escaping the perils of com-
modity marketing is to diversify into other functions 
or industries. A few processor-integrators have en-
tered the fast food business. Several have started, or 
are considering, the development of integrated cat-
fish, hog, and/ or egg operations. Unfortunately, 
these industries also tend to be characterized by a 
strong commodity orientation. Still, it may be a way 
of hedging one's bets that two or more commodities 
will not be ill at the same time. 
Conflict Between Members of the Vertical System 
The problem of coordinating the activities of ver-
tical system members is not. always easy to accomplish. 
Conflicts frequently arise. An important function 
of buyer-seller negotiations is to resolve these conflicts, 
usually through compromise, to the mutual satisfac-
tion of both parties. Deeper conflicts that persist over 
time may eventually develop into pressures which 
must be reconciled for the health of the system. Con-
flicts may arise over many issues, including the distri-
bution of returns, control over decisions in the sys-
tem, the sharing of risks, satisfactory performance of 
a function, etc. 
Within the broiler complex, the most apparent 
point of conflict in recent years has been between 
broiler integrators and contract growers. Issues in-
volved include grower payments, the length of con-
tracts, the clarity of contracts, methods of settlement, 
the length of time. between batches, the forced adop-
tion of new technology, and others. Many of these 
issues relate to the. lack of adequate communication 
and understanding between integrators and growers 
concerning the many facets of their relationship. 
This, coupled with the feelings of many growers that 
they have little power in bargaining over contracts, 
represents the seeds of the conflict which has occurred. 
Until recently, relatively little group action has 
been taken by growers. Cooperatives have not been 
a strong element in broiler growing. Farm organiza-
tions, with occasional exceptions, have not been im-
portant spokesmen or leaders for broiler growers. 
The efforts of the American Farm Bureau Fed-
eration and the National Farmers Organization in 
trying to organize grower bargaining associations in 
recent years have been aimed at resolving some of the 
grower-integrator problems. Their activity has stimu-
lated the clarification of contracts and settlement 
terms to some extent and is credited with tidying up 
some aspects of integrator-grower relations. The im-
pact of future bargaining activities, if pursued with 
reason, could be beneficial to the long-run welfare of 
the system. The timing of bargaining activities is 
critical, however. During periods of depressed prices, 
integrators are naturally more reluctant to grant con-
cessions on grower payments. And if integrators are 
forced to pay too high a fee for the employment of 
growers and their facilities, they will find it profitable 
to develop more grow-out facilities of their own. 
The results of bargail!ing efforts will be of con-
siderable concern to the system .. Unfortunately, what 
is regarded as equitable largely depends upon the per-
spective of the viewer. 
The other most frequent point of conflict in the 
broiler system is the integrator-large chain relation-
ship. Since large chains tend to emphasize a low 
price appeal, some integrators feel they have exterted 
a continual downward pressure on prices, and have 
given little encouragement to higher quality standards 
or to product innovations. Some integrators also 
claim that certain chains continually clip them by re-
porting low weights on delivered ice packed broilers. 86 
Many of these conflicts reflect a desire by inte-
grators for more bargaining power. and/ or a more co-
operative working relationship with large chains in 
which the long run welfare of the broiler system is 
considered. These types of conflicts are certainly not 
unique to this particular interface. 
Protection of National, Regional, 
oi' Vocational Interests 
The protection of self-interest is a rather funda-
mental instinct, whether it concerns an individual 
fighting for his job or a nation protecting its economic 
86Poultry Meat Magazine, Watt Publishing Co., Mt. Morris, Ill., 
July 1971, p. 13. 
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welfare. Several changes have resulted from this 
force in the broiler system. The tariff barriers im-
posed by the Common Market have already received 
comment. These, in turn, set. in motion a counter 
force by the U.S. broiler industry and government to 
negotiate a reduction in such tariffs, to find products 
(such as broiler parts) not severely penalized by the 
tariff, and to develop trade with other countries. 
Progress has been made in the last two areas, but has 
still not offset the impact of the E.E.C. tariff. 
Labor unions were among the primary forces be-
hind the Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957. 
As poultry processing began to shift geographically 
from the North to non-union areas of the South, local 
unions in the North tried to protect meat cutter jobs 
by encouraging local health departments to establish 
health codes which would act as barriers to ready-to-
cook poultry being shipped into their metropolitan 
areas. This soon precipitated conflicts between local, 
state and federal health agencies-and to some extent 
between state and federal departments of agriculture. 
As is often the case, the health barriers imposed re-
strictions and complications not at first anticipated. 
As local barriers were eliminated, labor unions 
moved to~ard organizing processing plants. In some 
cases, unfounded criticisms of the health standards of 
processing plants were allegedly made public for 
union leverage. This exposed the vulnerability of 
non-federally inspected processors to such accusations, 
and prompted many larger processors to support man-
datory federal inspection. 
Mandatory federal inspection, which was imple-
mented in 1959, created several second-order changes. 
Many small processors chose to leave the industry. 
Others chose this as an appropriate time to enter proc-
essing. Still other firms, which had to remodel plants 
to conform, also expanded capacity. The net effect 
was a significant increase in processor capacity, which 
in turn brought greater competition for growers, and 
the encouragement of increased production. These 
second-order effects of the 1957 law probably played 
a large part in the price depression of 1961. As a re-
sult, some of the new entrants to the industry had rela-
tively short lives. 
The consumerism wave of recent years is credited 
with being the primary force behind the Wholesome 
Poultry Products Act of 1968.87 This act extended 
the provisions of the 1957 act to cover intrn-state 
processing plants, and provided for additional safe-
guards at the processing level. 
87For an interesting commentary on the role of industry trade 
associations in this legislation, see Broiler Industry, Dec. 1968. This 
chronicle is of particular interest for the strategy involved, and the 
positioning of the association to realize a politically acceptable and 
industry acceptable piece of legislation. 
Many other changes could be cited which reflect 
one or more of these change forces. In nearly all 
cases, the dynamics of competitive, profit seeking en-
tities, interacting with their environment, played a 
major role. The maintenance and balancing of these 
competitive forces is certainly a major concern of those 
involved in public policy. 
Deterrents to Desired Adiustme1;1ts 
There are relatively few impediments to desired 
adjustments in the broiler system. One of the most 
frequently mentioned deterrents is the cash accounting 
privilege available to producers for tax purposes. This 
allows an integrator to use cash accounting for his 
hatchery supply flocks, hatchery, grain inventories, 
and grow-out operations. Industry sources indicate 
that independent integrators use cash accounting to 
a greater extent than diversified national firms. 
One effect of cash accounting is to stimulate con-
tinued expansion in order to reduce tax payments, a 
situation which works contrary to the stability needs 
of the industry. However, there is a lack of unanim-
ity on whether it should be discontinued. 
"Some sharply criticize cash basis accounting as 
the biggest single cause of overproduction in the poul-
try industry, since it is the only way a producer can 
postpone paying taxes on inventory. Others argue 
that without it, many of the smaller companies could 
not survive. " 88 
In addition to stimulating increases in produc-
tion, cash accounting may also result in misinterpreta-
86Broiler Industry, Dec. 1968, p. 30. 
tion of the profitability of broiler operations since costs 
are not associated with particular lots of broilers. A 
firm which builds up grain inventories prior to the 
end of the year charges this expense to that year's 
broiler crop rather than allocating it to the cost of the 
broilers which will consume it. Some firms keep two 
sets of books, one cash and one accrual, in order to 
avoid the problem of deceptive accounting results. 
The lack of importance of grower cooperatives in 
the broiler system might also be considered a deterrent 
to desired adjustments. Their presence might well 
have stimulated group actiOn by contract growers at 
an earlier time to improve contract terms and clarity, 
increase grower-integrator understanding, and main-
tain more balanced and equitable integrat.nr,-grower 
relations. The recent bargaining efforts, which have 
sometimes taken the form of confrontation and pain 
bargaining) might have taken place under more favor-
able conditions if there had been earlier efforts to im-
prove communication and resolve conflicts. 
The development of more information on expect-
ed supplies 6 to 12 months ahead might benefit the 
stability of the industry. In addition to existing in-
formation on breeder chick placements, information 
on changes in industry capacity might also be useful 
in estimating future supplies. The effect of such in-
formation is certainly far from clear, however. Supply 
projections often stimulate action by individual firms 
which alters future supplies. The strong influence 
of independent decision makers trying to outguess 
their competitors would continue to exist and might 
very well result in continued price instabilities. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The vertical broiler system of 1972 is probably 
the most tightly coordinated commodity system in 
U. S. agriculture.89 In approximately 2 decades, it 
has moved from a loosely organized system which 
typically involved five or six firms linked by open 
markets, to a system in which only three entities are 
often involved, and which is tightly bound together by 
contracts and vertical ownership. Because of its rap-
id transition from a market coordinated system to an 
entrepreneurally planned system, it represents a par-
ticularly popular system to examine, to determine the 
relative advantages of different coordinating instru-
ments. 
One of the ironies of the broiler system is that 
although individual integra,tors have developed tightly 
coordinated vertical networks, the system in the ag-
89Some competitors for this title include canning crops, some 
forest products, and a number of specialties. 
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gregate has continued to ·have coordination problems, 
if relatively stable prices and profits are used as cri-
teria. This points out the important distinction be-
tween the coordination of individual firm vertical net-
works and coordination of the total vertical system. 
Many people have expected improved coordination of 
the total broiler system as fewer, larger, and profes-
sionally managed firms populated the system. This 
has not occurred. While only about 40 broiler inte-
grators represent two-thirds of the broilers slaughtered, 
there are still enough to prevent collusive agree-
ments. The responsiveness of the total system in 
shifting resource allocations still depends upon the 
composite effects of many individual decision makers 
as they try to outguess the market and their competi-
tors. To date, the results h~ve been mercurial prices 
and profits, with consumers the main beneficiaries. 
In most cases, vertical integration in the broiler 
system has resulted from desires to shift risk, to obtain 
financing, to protect existing businesses, to assure sup-
plies, to implement new technology, or to seize growth 
opportunities. It is often assumed that the present 
organization of the system provides greater efficiency 
and coordination than a comparable system linked by 
open markets. This may be true, although there is 
no solid evidence that integrated systems are inherent-
ly superior to market coordinated systems or vice 
versa. It is clear that the integrated broiler system 
has substantially lowered the cost of broilers, and has 
likely achieved this cost reduction faster than possible 
with a market coordinated system. It is also clear 
that an integrated system embodies certain efficiencies, 
particularly those related to transactions. The num-
ber of salesmen and buyers is considerably less in an 
integrated system than in a market coordinated sys-
tem. What is not known is the extent to which these 
transactional efficiencies may be offset by inefficien-
cies in the other aspects of an integrated operation. 
McCammon contends that entrepreneurally 
planned systems reach their peak of efficiency quicker 
than market coordinated systems.90 However, there is 
also some evidence that over time, the former become 
more rigid systems that are less adaptable and respon-
sive to exogenous forces. Unfortunately, much of this 
remains in the area of speculation. 
Because the broiler system has become fully in-
tegrated, it does not provide two vertical networks, 
one integrated and the other coordinated by markets, 
for comparison. Given the same technology, scale 
of operations, etc., this would be an extremely useful 
comparison since it would indicate, at least in one in-
stance, if and why one coordination method is super-
ior to the other. 
The change forces and responding decisions 
which have brought the broiler system to its present 
position represent a fascinating example of an evolv-
ing, energetic, free enterprise system. To a large ex-
tent, change has occurred through a series of deci-
sions, each of which created small incremental 
changes, but whose cumulative effect has been sub-
stantial. Pinpointing an innovative decision as the 
genesis of a change is often impossible for this reason. 
In a few cases, however, change has been more 
episodic in nature, resulting from the action of a par-
ticular business manager or government official. 
Poultry inspection laws enacted in 195 7 and in 1968 
were of this type. The earlier law in particular repre-
sents an episodic change which created sizeable waves 
affecting the entire industry. Gradual but cumulative 
90McCammon, Bert C., Jr. 1970. System Management. In 
Vertical Marketing Systems. Edited by Louis P. Bucklin, Scott, Fores-
man and Co., Glenview, Ill. 
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changes, on the other hand, tend to generate ripples of 
imbalance which can be more easily adjusted to, but 
also which can be more easily ignored by firms in the 
industry. 
Many of the changes creating the present indus-
trialized broiler system stem from the relatively unfet-
tered forces of competitive rivalry. Aggressive and 
innovative entrepreneurial actions have created eco-
nomic results which are without question laudable. 
However, the performance of the system is not 
without its critics. Many of these are concerned 
with the important role of large agribusiness firms as 
contractors, and the relegation of growers to the sta-
tus of poorly paid hired hands. 
The limited evidence on this subject suggests that 
while growers have not been overwhelmed with pros-
perity, neither have integrators; that large agribusi-
ness firms such as Purina may possess many types of 
power, but are still unable to manage broiler prices to 
any degree; and that the big benefactor of the broiler 
system evolution has been the American consumer. 
The sociological effects of contracting on Maine 
broiler growers were studied by Prof. Louis Ploch, 
University of Maine, first in 1957 and later in 1963. 
The results indicated little resentment toward the sys-
tem of contract growing or toward contracting firms; 
nor was there evidence that contracting had signifi-
cantly reduced their perceived independence. Most 
growers affirmed the value of independence and saw 
little conflict between this philosophy and their posi-
tion as contract growers. 91 While these results relate 
to a somewhat unique geographic area of broiler pro-
duction and may not hold true in other areas, they 
lend no support to, the notion that growers have been 
deprived of their dignity and independence. How-
ever, additional studies are warranted to examine in 
a more comprehensive fashion the sociological and 
economic impact of contract production on the farm 
families involved. 
Members of the broiler system might also ques-
tion its performance, not from the standpoint of pub-
lic welfare, but from the standpoint of the firms and 
people inhabiting the system. Severe price depres-
sions entail both economic and social costs. Invest-
ments and jobs are lost. Competitors leave the in-
dustry. Potential new entrants are deterred. Can 
this type of performance be considered good? What 
are the alternatives? 
Given the nature of the broiler system, stable 
prices depend upon increased horizontal coordination 
at some stage in the system. The National Broiler 
Marketing Association was created largely for this 
91Ploch, Louis A. Nov. 1965. Maine's Contract Broiler Growers 
-A Restudy. Misc. Pub. 669, Maine Agri. Exp. Sta., Orono. 
purpose. Whether it will be allowed to function in a 
supply influencing capacity depends largely on the 
Justice Department's eventual ruling on whether in-
tegrators qualify as producers, and hence can be mem-
bers of an and-trust exempt Capper-Volstead coop-
erative. Indeed, whether this exemption can be used 
to sanction an industry-wide monopoly is a question 
that may be raised, either in the Congress or the courts. 
Even if integrators are deemed eligible so that the 
road is cleared for NBMA to expand its membership to 
represent a larger proportion of total output, the suc-
cess of NBMA in stabilizing prices at a profitable level 
will still depend upon its ability to persuade its mem-
bers to follow supply adjustment and pricing guide-
lines; also. on the actions of non-members. After its 
first year of operation, NBMA claimed it was respon-
sible for improving prices by 1 cent per pound or more 
by encouraging members to tailor the volume slaugh~ 
tered to weekly patterns of consumption, and through 
the influence of its supply adjustment and pricing 
guidelines. 92 
To date, NBMA depends entirely on the coopera-
tion of its members. Whether this is a sufficient basis 
for long run price stability remains to be seen. The 
spirit of cooperation is likely greater during and im-
mediately following a severe price depression than 
during profitable periods. 
The impact of any horizontal coordination effort, 
such as NBMA, on consumer prices is a justified con-
cern. In the case of NBMA the public interest dan-
gers appear relatively small since: 
• NBMA has no actual control over prices or sup-
plies. It depends entirely upon persuasion with 
its members. 
• A significant portion of broiler production is like-
ly to continue to be represented by firms which 
are not members of NBMA.. This should act as 
a check on NBMA. 
• While the members of NBMA can legally ex-
change information on market condition, prices, 
etc., the co-op remains subject to most of the 
antitrust statutes concerning predatory practices, 
price discrimination, or efforts to monopolize. 
The Secretary of Agriculture, the Federal Trade 
Commission, or the Justice Department may in-
tercede if prices are unduly enhanced. 
• NBMA members would continue to have an in-
centive to increase their individual profits. If 
prices increased to very profitable levels, individ-
ual firms would be expected to expand produc-
tion, regardless of the NBMA guidelines. The 
number of broiler integrators is still too large for 
any supply control collusion to exist for long. 
92Broiler Industry, Nov. 1971, pp. 30, 35. 
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This type of collective action does seem to com-
bine the checks and balances necessary to protect the· 
public interest. Whether it can be effective in sta-
bilizing prices, investments, and jobs in the broiler 
system is open to conjecture. Since instability tends 
to eliminate present or potential competitors, and in-
volves definite costs to t;Iie system, stable prices at a 
reasonable level could bring long-run public benefits 
as well as industry benefits. 
Instability and low profits have not prevented 
the broiler system from providing many commendable 
benefits to consumers. Instability, however, is not 
desirable per se. Hence, the study raises these ques-
tions: 
1. Is instability inherent in the nature of the broil-
er system, whoever conducts its functions? 
2. Is there need for more and better information? 
3. Would greater stability be achieved if two of 
the remaining three stages were more closely 
integrated-or all three (forward contracting 
with retailers, for example) ? Or does the an-
swer lie in increased horizontal coordination of 
some type? 
4. Is complete refragmentation an answer, with 
diffusion at each stage in the system? 
5. Should a system authority proscribe production 
flows? If so, should this be an industry associa-
tion or cartel (as in some countries), or a gov-
ernment authority? Has anything been learned 
from Canada or other countries in this regard? 
The vertical broiler system most clearly repre-
sents the evolving nature of the agricultural economy 
from a production oriented, loosely coordinated, at-
omistic, and unsophisticated economy where rural 
values were very evident-to a market oriented, highly 
coordinated, large firm economy that reflects the 
values of an industrialized economy. The social and 
economic gains and losses from this transition are poor-
ly understood. The broiler system has provided con-
sumers with wholesome broilers at the lowest cost in 
history, and yet has been unsuccessful in achieving an 
acceptable degree of price stability. Other gains and 
losses involved have been only partially evaluated. 
There is a pressing need to understand and eval-
uate the causes and results of the transitions occurring 
in the organization of the agricultural economy. Since 
many of these changes involve shifts in vertical refa-
tionships, existing models dealing largely with hori-
zontal relationships 'are inadequate. For this reason, 
a vertical conceptual approach was used in this study. 
Comments About the Conceptual Approach 
The conceptual framework used in this study 
posits vertical market systems as interrelated social and 
economic systems in which coordination is required 
to effectively integrate the functional inputs of sys-
tem members. These systems are constantly evolving 
and adjusting due to pressures from horizontal compe-
tition, vertical conflict, changes in market rules or 
arrangements, and environmental forces. In the pre-
vious chapters, the vertical broiler system has been 
examined by using this perspective and the taxonomy 
of vertical systems described in Chapter I. 
One of the primary concerns· of this effort was 
to develop and test a conceptual approach which ade-
quately dealt with the dynamic characteristics of 
vertical commodity systems; which provided insights 
into how and why coordination and adaptation, the 
two primary dynamic dimensions of vertical systems, 
occur or fail to occur. This was accomplished in a 
modest way with the conceptual approach used in 
studying the broiler system. From a researcher's 
standpoint, the taxonomy of vertical systems provided 
a useful way of thinking about and classifying the 
many dimensions, characteristics, forces, and interre-
lationships in a vertical market system. This in turn 
facilitated identification of the critical aspects of a 
vertical complex needing examination. It focused at-
tention on many of the relevant questions which need-
ed to be answered. 
It is acknowledged that this is a modest contribu-
tion to the analysis of vertical market systems. The 
conceptual approach in this study proved useful, yet 
was also seriously deficient in its ability to rigorously 
address normative or positive system relationships. The 
approach itself proposes no new hypotheses concerning 
system behavior or performance that are sufficiently 
explicit to allow testing, even though it does implicitly 
challenge the adequacy of many existing hypotheses 
and tests. These are serious weaknesses which need 
to be overcome if vertical systems analysis with a dy-
namic orientation is to find expanded applications in 
the public policy arena. 
For use by industry personnel, these weaknesses 
are less critical. As a perspective and a way of sub-
jectively understanding the dynamics of a vertical 
system, the conceptual approach employed in this 
study should be of considerable value. 
A major obstacle in developing more definitive 
models of vertical market systems is the paucity of re-
search on the interface of firms within a vertical com-
plex. The behavioral dimensions of conflict, coop-
eration and power are in particular need of further 
understanding. The effects of these forces on system 
coordination, adaptation, efficiency, innovativeness, 
and other aspects of performance become clearly ap-
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parent in such a study as the present one. Unfor-
tunately, these variables could not be treated in this 
study with the thoroughness they deserve. 
Studies are needed which examine the role of 
these behavioral dimensions and their interrelation-
ships with horizontal competitive forces. Stern and 
his colleagues have done some exploratory studies of 
conflict and power in market channels with reasonable 
results. 93 If these behavioral variables can be mea-
sured and analyzed, more definitive models of vertical 
market systems should be possible. 
The organization and coordination of many ver-
tical commodity systems are undergoing considerable 
change. Contracts, joint ventures, and vertical own-
ership are generally increasing in importance as meth-
ods of coordination and interfirm linkage. The ex-
tent to which these instruments replace spot markets 
because of long term advantages vs. short run or one-
time benefits is not known. For example, wherever-
tical integration is entered into to accelerate the adop-
tion of new technology, or to by-pass unreasonable 
union contracts, the benefits may be short run in na-
ture. Where this is true, could disintegration then 
occur without impairing system performance? 
Logic suggests that the more permanent types of 
linkages should provide some lasting technical effici-
ency benefits. Exchange should be more efficient, 
goals should be more in harmony, and resources 
should be more efficiently utilized. The extent to 
which this is true (if at all) is not known. These ar-
rangements also appear to move firms toward a part-
nership relationship and away from an adversary rela-
tionship. This suggests increased vertical coopera-
tion, which may enhance system performance. Wheth-
er this is true, or whether coercion and constrained 
conflict characterize inter-firm relations in these situ-
ations, is open to conjecture. 
With the present state of the arts, there are no 
conceptual models adequately dealing with these types 
of unknowns. Certainly the conceptual approach 
employed in this study is not yet sufficiently developed 
to meet the challenge. However, the W eltanschau-
ung suggested by this approach-how one sees the 
world-carries strong appeal in addressing critical 
questions concerning the organization and coordina-
tion of vertical commodity complexes. At this point 
in time, this may be a needed and useful contribution. 
93See Rosenberg, Larry J. and Louis W. Stern. Nov. 1971. Con-
flict Measurement in the Distribution Channel. Journal of Marketing 
Research; also El-Ansary, Adel I. and Louis Stern. Feb. 1972. Power 
Measurement in the Distribution Channel. Journal of Marketing Re-
search. 
BETTER LIVING IS THE PRODUCT 
of research at the Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center. 
All Ohioans benefit from this product. 
Ohio's 110,000 farm families benefit from the results of agricul-· 
tural research translated into increased earnings and improved living 
conditions. So do the families of the thousands of workers employed 
in the firms making up the state's $8 billion agribusiness complex. 
But the greatest benefits of agricultural research flow to the mil-
lions of Ohio consumers. They enjoy the end products of agricultural 
science-the world's most wholesome and nutritious food, attractive 
lawns, beautiful ornamental plants, and hundreds of consumer prod-
ucts containing ingredients originating on the farm, in the greenhouse 
and nursery, or in the forest. 
The Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station, as the Center was called 
for 83 years, was established at The Ohio State University, Columbus, 
in 1882. Ten years later, the Station was moved to its present loca-
tion in Wayne County. In 1965, the Ohio General Assembly passed 
legislation changing the name to Ohio Agricultural Research and De-
velopment Center-a name which more accurately reflects the nature 
and scope of the Center's research program today. 
Research at OARDC deals with the improvement of all agricul-
tural production and marketing practices. It is concerned with the de-
velopment of an agricultural product from germination of a seed or 
development of an embryo through· to the consumer's dinner table. It 
is directed at improved human nutrition, family and child development, 
home management, and all other aspects of family life. It is geared 
to enhancing and preserving the quality of our environment. 
Individuals and groups are welcome to visit the OARDC, to enjoy 
the attractive buildings, grounds, and arboretum, and to observe first 
hand research aimed at the goal of Better Living for All Ohioans! 
7~ State 1~ dee eamft"4 lo~ 
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Ohio's major soil types and climatic 
conditions are represented at the Re-
search Center's 13 locations. Thus, Cen-
ter scientists can make field tests under 
conditions similar to those encountered 
by Ohio farmers. 
Research is conducted by 15 depart-
ments on more than 6500 acres at Center 
headquarters in Wooster, nine branches, 
Green Springs Crops Research Unit, Pom-
erene Forest Laboratory, and The Ohio 
State University. 
Center Headquarters, Wooster, Wayne 
County: 1953 acres 
Eastern Ohio Resource Development Cen-
ter, Caldwell, Noble County: 2053 
acres 
Green Springs Crops Research Unit, Green 
Springs, Sandusky County: 26 acres 
Jackson Branch, Jackson, Jackson Coun-
ty: 344 acres 
Mahoning County Farm, Canfield: 275 
acres 
Muck Crops Branch, Willard, Huron Coun-
ty: 15 acres 
North Central Branch, Vickery, Erie Coun-
ty: 335 acres 
Northwestern Branch, Hoytville, Wood 
County: 247 acres 
Pomerene Forest, Laboratory, Keene 
Township, Coshocton County: 227 
acres 
Southeastern Branch, Carpenter, Meigs 
County: 330 acres 
Southern Branch, Ripley, Brown County: 
275 acres 
Western Branch, South Charleston, Clark 
County: 428 acres 
